DoS or local data modification via malicious record IDs in WatermelonDB
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 23/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.76% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 54.5% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: @nozbe/watermelondb (npm) 0.16.2, 0.15.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @nozbe/watermelondb (npm) 0.16.2, 0.15.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In WatermelonDB (NPM package "@nozbe/watermelondb") before versions 0.15.1 and 0.16.2, a maliciously crafted record ID can exploit a SQL Injection vulnerability in iOS adapter implementation and cause the app to delete all or selected records from the database, generally causing the app to become unusable. This may happen in apps that don't validate IDs (valid IDs are `/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-.]+$/`) and use Watermelon Sync or low-level `database.adapter.destroyDeletedRecords` method. The integrity risk is low due to the fact that maliciously deleted records won't synchronize, so logout-login will restore all data, although some local changes may be lost if the malicious deletion causes the sync process to fail to proceed to push stage. No way to breach confidentiality with this vulnerability is known. Full exploitation of SQL Injection is mitigated, because it's not possible to nest an insert/update query inside a delete query in SQLite, and it's not possible to pass a semicolon-separated second query. There's also no known practicable way to breach confidentiality by selectively deleting records, because those records will not be synchronized. It's theoretically possible that selective record deletion could cause an app to behave insecurely if lack of a record is used to make security decisions by the app. This is patched in versions 0.15.1, 0.16.2, and 0.16.1-fix
- Published
- Jun 3, 2020
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.7% · 54th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-89
Report tools
Action score
23
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 23 / 40 · 5.9 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.7%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 5.9
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 5.9
- agree
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| nozbe | watermelondb | cpe:2.3:a:nozbe:watermelondb |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- nozbe watermelondbbefore 0.15.1
- nozbe watermelondb0.16.0
- nozbe watermelondb0.16.1
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Nozbe WatermelonDB
- < 0.15.1, >= 0.16.0, < 0.16.2affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @nozbe/watermelondb | from 0.16.0 · before 0.16.2 | 0.16.2 |
| npm | @nozbe/watermelondb | before 0.15.1 | 0.15.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@nozbe/watermelondb | 0.15.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:@nozbe/watermelondb | 0.16.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-89 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
The query text is built by concatenating user input. The database cannot tell where the data ends and the command begins.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-89 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query( "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = '" + owner + "'");Fixed
const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query( "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = $1", [owner]);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Command Line Execution through SQL InjectionCAPEC-108likelihood: Low · Very High
- Object Relational Mapping InjectionCAPEC-109likelihood: Low · High
- SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter TamperingCAPEC-110likelihood: High · Very High
- Expanding Control over the Operating System from the DatabaseCAPEC-470Very High
- SQL InjectionCAPEC-66likelihood: High · High
- Blind SQL InjectionCAPEC-7likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.