praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can delete the entire workspace via DELETE /workspaces/{id}
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Published
- Jul 21, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 22, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.5% · 42th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-269
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Report tools
Action score
32
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.5%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 8.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
MervinPraison praisonai-platform
- < 0.1.4affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | praisonai-platform | before 0.1.4 | 0.1.4 |
Same product
mervinpraison: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-47410praisonai-platform: JWT signing key defaults to hardcoded "dev-secret-change-me", allowing token forgery for any user when PLATFORM_ENV is unset39Monitor
- CVE-2026-47416praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can promote themselves (or any other member) to owner via PATCH /workspaces/{id}/members/{user_id}38Monitor
- CVE-2026-47413praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can add arbitrary user as owner via POST /workspaces/{id}/members38Monitor
- CVE-2026-47407PraisonAI Platform has a cross-workspace IDOR + member-role privilege escalation37Monitor
- CVE-2026-48169PraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API35Monitor
- CVE-2026-47405PraisonAI Platform missing role checks let any workspace member become owner and take over workspace membership35Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:praisonai-platform | 0.1.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-474130 days apartpraisonai-platform: Any workspace member can add arbitrary user as owner via POST /workspaces/{id}/members38Monitor
- CVE-2026-474160 days apartpraisonai-platform: Any workspace member can promote themselves (or any other member) to owner via PATCH /workspaces/{id}/members/{user_id}38Monitor
- CVE-2026-474070 days apartPraisonAI Platform has a cross-workspace IDOR + member-role privilege escalation37Monitor
- CVE-2026-474090 days apartpraisonai-platform: Any workspace member can remove any other member (including the owner) via DELETE /workspaces/{id}/members/{user_id}32Monitor
- CVE-2026-474110 days apartpraisonai-platform: Any workspace member can rewrite workspace name, description, and settings via PATCH /workspaces/{id}26Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-269 · Improper Privilege ManagementCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Root cause
To simplify setup, a service account is granted broad, cluster-wide permissions. The principle of least privilege is skipped during installation.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-269 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
kind: ClusterRolerules: - apiGroups: ["*"] resources: ["*"] verbs: ["*"]Fixed
kind: Rolemetadata: namespace: lodos-systemrules: - apiGroups: ["apps"] resources: ["deployments"] verbs: ["get", "list", "update"]Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/24385d64876577620f749957bd4814f162f4ca47
- github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/pull/1686
- github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-g8rr-7rj2-f627
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.