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CVE-2026-47406· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

praisonai-platform: Dependency endpoints accept any issue_id and dep_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace issue linking + read + delete IDOR

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The dependency endpoints (`POST/GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies` and `DELETE .../dependencies/{dep_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then dispatch to `DependencyService` calls that take URL/body-supplied issue and dependency IDs without verifying any of them belong to the membership-checked workspace. Most damaging: `create_dependency` accepts `body.depends_on_issue_id` from the request body — that ID is checked against nothing — letting an attacker create a "blocks" or "related" link between any two issues anywhere in the database. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

HighCVSS 8.1 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Jul 21, 2026
Updated
Jul 21, 2026
EPSS
0.4% · 33th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

32

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.4%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
8.1
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • MervinPraison praisonai-platform

    • < 0.1.4affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIpraisonai-platformbefore 0.1.40.1.4

Same product

mervinpraison: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-47410praisonai-platform: JWT signing key defaults to hardcoded "dev-secret-change-me", allowing token forgery for any user when PLATFORM_ENV is unset
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2026-47416praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can promote themselves (or any other member) to owner via PATCH /workspaces/{id}/members/{user_id}
    38Monitor
  • CVE-2026-47413praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can add arbitrary user as owner via POST /workspaces/{id}/members
    38Monitor
  • CVE-2026-47407PraisonAI Platform has a cross-workspace IDOR + member-role privilege escalation
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2026-48169PraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-47405PraisonAI Platform missing role checks let any workspace member become owner and take over workspace membership
    35Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:praisonai-platform0.1.4Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-4816917 days apartPraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-474150 days apartpraisonai-platform: Issue endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2026-474190 days apartpraisonai-platform: Agent endpoints accept any agent_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2026-474170 days apartpraisonai-platform: Comment endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace comment read and post IDOR
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2026-474180 days apartpraisonai-platform: Project endpoints accept any project_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2026-474140 days apartpraisonai-platform: Label endpoints accept any label_id and any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace label edit/delete and issue-label-li
    30Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

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Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd-secondary

Root cause

The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-639 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);res.json(invoice);

Fixed

ts
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({  id: req.params.id,  ownerId: req.user.id,});if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);res.json(invoice);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records