Apache Camel: Camel-Hazelcast: Unsafe Java deserialization in default-configured managed Hazelcast instances enables remote code execution
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component. The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast's JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel's default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes Camel apply a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig (whitelisting the java., javax. and org.apache.camel. class-name prefixes and blacklisting java.net.) to instances it creates from its own default configuration, while leaving any user-supplied Config or HazelcastInstance untouched. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a deserialization filter on the Hazelcast instance (Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or the JVM-wide system property -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*) and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster.
- Published
- Jul 6, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 7, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.0% · 61th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-502
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Report tools
Action score
32
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.0%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apache | camel | cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apache camel4.0.0 and later · before 4.14.8
- apache camel4.15.0 and later · before 4.18.3
- apache camel4.19.0 and later · before 4.21.0
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel
- 4.0.0 and later · before 4.14.8affected · semver
- 4.15.0 and later · before 4.18.3affected · semver
- 4.19.0 and later · before 4.21.0affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast | from 4.0.0 · before 4.14.8 | 4.14.8 |
| Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast | from 4.15.0 · before 4.18.3 | 4.18.3 |
| Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast | from 4.19.0 · before 4.21.0 | 4.21.0 |
Same product
apache: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2025-27636Apache Camel: Camel Message Header Injection via Improper Filtering51Plan
- CVE-2026-33453Apache Camel: CoAP URI Query Parameter to Exchange Header Injection in camel-coap Allows Single-Packet Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution42Plan
- CVE-2025-29891Apache Camel: Camel Message Header Injection through request parameters42Plan
- CVE-2016-8749Apache Camel's Jackson and JacksonXML unmarshalling operation are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution attacks.42Plan
- CVE-2020-11973Apache Camel Netty enables Java deserialization by default.41Plan
- CVE-2020-11972Apache Camel RabbitMQ enables Java deserialization by default.41Plan
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.14.8 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.18.3 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.21.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Maven:org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast | 4.14.8 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast | 4.18.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast | 4.21.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-07-12 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+6 d
- TodaySep 30, 2026+87 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- gaorenyusifinder
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-438670 days apartApache Camel: Camel-PQC: The AWS Secrets Manager key-lifecycle manager deserializes persisted key metadata with java.io.ObjectInputStream and no ObjectInputFilt39Monitor
- CVE-2026-4086070 days apartApache Camel: Unsafe Deserialization of JMS ObjectMessage in camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-sjms2 and camel-amqp39Monitor
- CVE-2026-3345470 days apartApache Camel: Inbound Header Filter Missing in MailHeaderFilterStrategy Allows Remote Code Execution via MIME Header Injection (CVE-2025-30177 Variant)37Monitor
- CVE-2026-465900 days apartApache Camel: Camel-PQC: The HashiCorp Vault and AWS Secrets Manager key-lifecycle managers deserialize persisted key metadata with java.io.ObjectInputStream an35Monitor
- CVE-2026-4047370 days apartApache Camel Mina: Unsafe Deserialization in MinaConverter.toObjectInput() via TCP/UDP35Monitor
- CVE-2026-4085870 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Infinispan: Unsafe Deserialization in Remote Aggregation Repository35Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-502 · Deserialization of Untrusted DataCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Root cause
Data received over the network is deserialized into the language’s native object format without verifying its source. Code paths inside the object can be triggered during deserialization.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-502 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
payload = sock.recv(65536)job = pickle.loads(payload)Fixed
payload = sock.recv(65536)if not hmac.compare_digest(sign(payload), header_sig): raise PermissionError("invalid signature")job = JobSchema.validate(json.loads(payload))Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
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Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
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We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.