Rack: `Rack::Request` accepts invalid Host characters, enabling host allowlist bypass.
Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. From versions 3.0.0.beta1 to before 3.1.21, and 3.2.0 to before 3.2.6, Rack::Request parses the Host header using an AUTHORITY regular expression that accepts characters not permitted in RFC-compliant hostnames, including /, ?, #, and @. Because req.host returns the full parsed value, applications that validate hosts using naive prefix or suffix checks can be bypassed. This can lead to host header poisoning in applications that use req.host, req.url, or req.base_url for link generation, redirects, or origin validation. This issue has been patched in versions 3.1.21 and 3.2.6.
- Published
- Apr 2, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 24, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 18th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-1286
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Report tools
Action score
26
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 6.5
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 4.8
- 1.7 point gap
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| rack | rack | cpe:2.3:a:rack:rack |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- rack rack3.0.0 and later · before 3.1.21
- rack rack3.2.0 and later · before 3.2.6
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
rack rack
- >= 3.0.0.beta1, < 3.1.21, >= 3.2.0, < 3.2.6affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:13 | ruby-rack | before 3.1.20-0+deb13u2 | 3.1.20-0+deb13u2 |
| Debian:14 | ruby-rack | before 3.2.6-2 | 3.2.6-2 |
| RubyGems | rack | from 3.0.0.beta1 · before 3.1.21 | 3.1.21 |
| RubyGems | rack | from 3.2.0 · before 3.2.6 | 3.2.6 |
Same product
rack: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2024-25126Rack ReDos in content type parsing (2nd degree polynomial)41Plan
- CVE-2024-26146Possible Denial of Service Vulnerability in Rack Header Parsing31Monitor
- CVE-2023-27530A DoS vulnerability exists in Rack <v3.0.4.2, <v2.2.6.3, <v2.1.4.3 and <v2.0.9.3 within in the Multipart MIME parsing code in which could al31Monitor
- CVE-2026-34827Rack: Algorithmic-Complexity DoS in Rack::Multipart::Parser30Monitor
- CVE-2026-34830Rack: Rack::Sendfile regex injection via HTTP_X_ACCEL_MAPPING header allows arbitrary file reads through nginx30Monitor
- CVE-2026-34829Rack: Denial of Service via Unbounded Multipart File Upload Without Content-Length30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| debian:ruby-rack | 3.1.20-0+deb13u2 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
| RubyGems:rack | 3.1.21 | Package registry (OSV) |
| RubyGems:rack | 3.2.6 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:6 | 2026-07-03 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+91 d
- TodaySep 30, 2026+181 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-1286 · Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of InputCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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