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CVE-2021-29427· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

Repository content filters do not work in Settings pluginManagement

In Gradle from version 5.1 and before version 7.0 there is a vulnerability which can lead to information disclosure and/or dependency poisoning. Repository content filtering is a security control Gradle introduced to help users specify what repositories are used to resolve specific dependencies. This feature was introduced in the wake of the "A Confusing Dependency" blog post. In some cases, Gradle may ignore content filters and search all repositories for dependencies. This only occurs when repository content filtering is used from within a `pluginManagement` block in a settings file. This may change how dependencies are resolved for Gradle plugins and build scripts. For builds that are vulnerable, there are two risks: 1) Information disclosure: Gradle could make dependency requests to repositories outside your organization and leak internal package identifiers. 2) Dependency poisoning/Dependency confusion: Gradle could download a malicious binary from a repository outside your organization due to name squatting. For a full example and more details refer to the referenced GitHub Security Advisory. The problem has been patched and released with Gradle 7.0. Users relying on this feature should upgrade their build as soon as possible. As a workaround, users may use a company repository which has the right rules for fetching packages from public repositories, or use project level repository content filtering, inside `buildscript.repositories`. This option is available since Gradle 5.1 when the feature was introduced.

HighCVSS 7.2 · v3.1—Proof of concept No fix recorded
Published
Apr 13, 2021
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
1.3% · 69th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

28

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
28 / 40 · 7.2 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.3%

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
7.2
CNA · GitHub_M
8.0
0.8 point gap

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Affected systems

VendorProduct
gradlegradle
quarkusquarkus

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • gradle gradle5.1 and later · before 7.0
  • quarkus quarkusup to 2.2.3 inclusive

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • gradle gradle

    • >= 5.1, <= 6.8.3affected

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2019-15052The HTTP client in Gradle before 5.6 sends authentication credentials originally destined for the configured host.
    40Plan
  • CVE-2016-6199ObjectSocketWrapper.java in Gradle 2.12 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted serialized object.
    40Plan
  • CVE-2023-26053Gradle usage of long IDs for PGP keys opens potential for collision attacks
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2025-27148Gradle vulnerable to local privilege escalation through system temporary directory
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-22865Gradle's failure to disable repositories failing to answer can expose builds to malicious artifacts
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2026-22816Gradle fails to disable repositories which can expose builds to malicious artifacts
    34Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02025-07-07

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. First PoC+1545 d
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+1996 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • Administrator privileges are required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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