GHSA-j9gf-vw2f-9hrw: Appsmith: Configuration-dependent origin validation bypass in password reset and email verification link generation
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: com.appsmith:server (Maven) 2.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to com.appsmith:server (Maven) 2.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary A configuration-dependent origin validation bypass was identified in Appsmith’s password reset and email verification flows on current `release`. Both flows derive the email-link base URL from the request `Origin` header. The current validation only enforces a trusted base URL when `APPSMITH_BASE_URL` is configured. If that setting is unset, the application accepts the caller-supplied origin and uses it to generate token-bearing reset and verification links. On deployments with email delivery enabled and `APPSMITH_BASE_URL` unset, this can cause Appsmith to send security-sensitive links whose clickable host is attacker-controlled, which can plausibly lead to account takeover after victim interaction. ### Details The current `release` head at commit `e77639eca4974469c1e676904851ffdaedd38111` was reviewed. The relevant routes are publicly reachable in `SecurityConfig.java`: - `POST /forgotPassword` is permitted without authentication at line `209` - `POST /resendEmailVerification` is permitted without authentication at line `228` In `UserControllerCE.java`, both flows copy the request `Origin` header into the DTO field used as the email-link base URL: - `forgotPasswordRequest(...)` at lines `91-94` - `resendEmailVerification(...)` at lines `189-193` In `UserServiceCEImpl.java`, base URL validation is conditional: - `@Value("${APPSMITH_BASE_URL:}")` at line `113` - `resolveSecureBaseUrl(...)` at lines `132-145` That method explicitly documents and implements this behavior: - if `APPSMITH_BASE_URL` is configured, the provided URL must match it - if `APPSMITH_BASE_URL` is unset, the provided URL is accepted for backward compatibility The resulting base URL is then used to construct token-bearing links: - `FORGOT_PASSWORD_CLIENT_URL_FORMAT` at line `149` - reset URL generation at lines `282-289` - `EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CLIENT_URL_FORMAT` at line `152` - verification URL generation at lines `931-940` This means the base URL is not only used for branding or display purposes. It directly controls the clickable host of security-sensitive reset and verification links. Note that the admin UI describes APPSMITH_BASE_URL as required for password reset and email verification links in: - `app/client/src/ce/pages/AdminSettings/config/configuration.tsx` at lines `41-49` The reviewed self-host material indicates this protection is not fail-closed by default, which makes the vulnerable condition realistic on existing deployments where operators have not set `APPSMITH_BASE_URL`. ### PoC These steps were designed for validation on an Appsmith deployment that I own or am explicitly authorized to test. 1. Deploy a non-production Appsmith instance from current `release`, or any build containing the affected code. 2. Enable outbound email delivery. 3. Leave `APPSMITH_BASE_URL` unset or blank. 4. Use a test mailbox account you control, for example `victim@example.test`. 5. Send a password reset request with a forged `Origin` header: ```bash curl -i -X POST 'https://YOUR-INSTANCE/api/v1/users/forgotPassword' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \ --data '{"email":"victim@example.test"}' ``` 6. Inspect the delivered email. If affected, the clickable reset link is generated under `https://attacker.example/...` instead of the legitimate Appsmith host. 7. Repeat the same validation for resend email verification using an unverified test account: ```bash curl -i -X POST 'https://YOUR-INSTANCE/api/v1/users/resendEmailVerification' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \ --data '{"email":"victim@example.test"}' ``` 8. Inspect the delivered verification email. If affected, the clickable verification link is generated under `https://attacker.example/....` 9. Set `APPSMITH_BASE_URL=https://YOUR-INSTANCE`, restart the server, and repeat the same requests. 10. The expected secure behavior is that mismatched `Origin` is rejected, or the generated links no longer follow the forged request header. Live tokens, third-party data, or unsafe exploitation material was not included in this report. The attached archive contains source excerpts, data-flow proof, safe validation notes, and supporting evidence collected from the reviewed current branch. ### Impact This is a trust-boundary failure in token-bearing email authentication flows. Affected deployments are those where: - `APPSMITH_BASE_URL` is unset or blank - outbound email is enabled - password reset and/or email verification flows are enabled Attacker requirements are low: - no prior authentication is required to reach the relevant endpoints - the attacker only needs to trigger an email flow toward a target account Security impact: - Appsmith can generate password reset or verification emails whose clickable host is attacker-controlled - victim interaction can expose security-sensitive token material - this can plausibly result in account takeover - at minimum, it enables trusted-email abuse and phishing through the application itself ### mitigation 1. Remove the fallback behavior in `resolveSecureBaseUrl(...)` that accepts caller-supplied origin data when `APPSMITH_BASE_URL` is unset. 2. Fail closed for all token-bearing email flows when no trusted base URL is configured. 3. Use a single trusted-base-url helper across: - password reset - resend email verification - invite flows - instance admin invite flows 4. Add regression tests for the unset-configuration case. 5. Add startup or admin-level validation so security-sensitive email flows cannot operate until a trusted base URL is configured. ### Attachment [appsmith-email-link-origin-validation-bypass-20260321.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26153718/appsmith-email-link-origin-validation-bypass-20260321.zip)
- Published
- Jun 12, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 12, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-346
Report tools
Action score
32
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Maven | com.appsmith:server | pkg:maven/com.appsmith/server |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | com.appsmith:server | before 2.0 | 2.0 |
Same product
Maven: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-9wcp-79g5-5c3cAppsmith Super User Creation Race Condition Allows Multiple Instance Administrators32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:com.appsmith:server | 2.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-346 · Origin Validation ErrorCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)CAPEC-111likelihood: High · High
- Cache PoisoningCAPEC-141likelihood: High · High
- DNS Cache PoisoningCAPEC-142likelihood: High · High
- Exploit Script-Based APIsCAPEC-160Medium
- Exploitation of Trusted IdentifiersCAPEC-21likelihood: High · High
- Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-MiddleCAPEC-384Low
- Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API ManipulationCAPEC-385Medium
- Application API Navigation RemappingCAPEC-386Medium
ATT&CK techniques
- Access Token ManipulationT1134
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Steal Application Access TokenT1528
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache PoisoningT1557.002
- Compromise Infrastructure: DNS ServerT1584.002
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.