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CVE-2026-69201· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

Http4s: ResourceService and Webjar Service path escape via percent-encoded separators

Http4s is a Scala interface for HTTP services. Prior to 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47, ResourceService and WebjarService decode each URL path segment but reject only segments exactly equal to an empty string, a dot, or two dots. A request containing percent-encoded slash or backslash separators can turn an accepted segment into a parent-directory traversal after decoding, allowing access to classpath or WebJar resources outside the configured base when a directory-backed classpath is served and the backend preserves the encoded separator. The patch rejects decoded segments containing slash or backslash in ResourceService and WebjarService, and applies the same guard to the non-exploitable FileService for consistency. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47.

MediumCVSS 5.9 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Sep 15, 2026
Updated
Sep 16, 2026
EPSS
0.8% · 54th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

23

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
23 / 40 · 5.9 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.8%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
5.9
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • http4s http4s

    • < 0.23.35, >= 1.0.0-M1, < 1.0.0-M47affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Mavenorg.http4s:http4s-server_2.12before 0.23.350.23.35
Mavenorg.http4s:http4s-server_2.13from 1.0.0-M1 · before 1.0.0-M471.0.0-M47
Mavenorg.http4s:http4s-server_2.13before 0.23.350.23.35
Mavenorg.http4s:http4s-server_3from 1.0.0-M1 · before 1.0.0-M471.0.0-M47
Mavenorg.http4s:http4s-server_3before 0.23.350.23.35

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-69204Http4s: Ember accepts Transfer-Encoding combined with Content-Length (CL.TE request smuggling)
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-69217Http4s: Ember Server accepts duplicate Content-Length headers
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2026-69205Http4s: Ember Transfer-Encoding value parsing (TE.CL / TE.0 request smuggling)
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2026-54556Http4s: HTTP/2 Denial of Service with Ember Backend
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2026-88975Http4s: Ember HTTP/2 buffers a frame's declared payload before checking SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-69218Http4s Ember HTTP/2: unbounded continuation frame accumulation
    30Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Maven:org.http4s:http4s-server_2.120.23.35Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.http4s:http4s-server_2.130.23.35Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.http4s:http4s-server_2.131.0.0-M47Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.http4s:http4s-server_30.23.35Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.http4s:http4s-server_31.0.0-M47Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

All records