Wallos: OIDC state parameter never validated — login CSRF / account takeover
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.22% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: ellite Wallos 4.9.4.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to ellite Wallos 4.9.4 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Wallos is an open-source, self-hostable personal subscription tracker. Prior to version 4.9.4, login.php generates an OIDC state nonce stored in $_SESSION['oidc_state'], but checksession.php dispatches the OIDC callback without comparing the incoming state against the session value. An attacker can trick a victim into visiting a crafted URL, causing Wallos to exchange the attacker's authorization code and log the victim into the attacker's account. This issue has been patched in version 4.9.4.
- Published
- Aug 31, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 8, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 12th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-352
Report tools
Action score
30
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 7.5
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
ellite Wallos
- < 4.9.4affected
Same product
ellite: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-61640Wallos: SSRF via OIDC Token/UserInfo URL Configuration34Monitor
- CVE-2026-61639Wallos: Zip Slip path traversal in database restore writes files to webroot34Monitor
- CVE-2026-77348Wallos incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33407: unauthenticated httpoxy SSRF still reachable via `endpoints/payments/search.php`32Monitor
- CVE-2026-61641Wallos: OIDC account takeover via email-based account linking without `email_verified` check32Monitor
- CVE-2026-61638Wallos: SSRF via Test Email Notification - unvalidated SMTP host/port32Monitor
- CVE-2026-54600Wallos: Unauthenticated database replacement via import endpoint on fresh install32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| ellite Wallos | 4.9.4 · description | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- A
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-352 · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-352 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);Fixed
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.