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CVE-2026-52834· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

jxl-oxide: Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms

jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.

HighCVSS 7.3 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Aug 19, 2026
Updated
Sep 18, 2026
EPSS
0.2% · 6th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

29

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
29 / 40 · 7.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.2%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
7.3
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Affected systems

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Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • tirr-c jxl-grid

    • < 0.6.2affected
  • tirr-c jxl-oxide

    • < 0.12.6affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.iojxl-gridfrom 0.0.0-0 · before 0.6.20.6.2
crates.iojxl-gridbefore 0.6.20.6.2

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:jxl-grid0.6.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

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Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

nvd-secondary

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

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