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CVE-2026-25152· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

@backstage/plugin-techdocs-node vulnerable to possible Path Traversal in TechDocs Local Generator

Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals, and @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node provides common node.js functionalities for TechDocs. In versions of @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node prior to 1.13.11 and 1.14.1, a path traversal vulnerability in the TechDocs local generator allows attackers to read arbitrary files from the host filesystem when Backstage is configured with `techdocs.generator.runIn: local`. When processing documentation from untrusted sources, symlinks within the docs directory are followed by MkDocs during the build process. File contents are embedded into generated HTML and exposed to users who can view the documentation. This vulnerability is fixed in` @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node` versions 1.13.11 and 1.14.1. Some workarounds are available. Switch to `runIn: docker` in `app-config.yaml` and/or restrict write access to TechDocs source repositories to trusted users only.

MediumCVSS 6.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

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Published
Jan 30, 2026
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
0.4% · 36th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

26

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.4%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
6.5
CNA · GitHub_M
5.3
1.2 point gap

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
linuxfoundationbackstage

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • linuxfoundation backstagebefore 1.13.11
  • linuxfoundation backstage1.14.0 and later · before 1.14.1

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • backstage backstage

    • < 1.13.11, = 1.14.0affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@backstage/plugin-techdocs-nodefrom 1.14.0 · before 1.14.11.14.1
npm@backstage/plugin-techdocs-nodebefore 1.13.111.13.11

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2023-35926Insecure sandbox in Backstage Scaffolder plugin
    40Plan
  • CVE-2026-25153@backstage/plugin-techdocs-node vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via MkDocs hooks
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2021-43783Path Traversal in @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2024-45816Storage bucket Directory Traversal in @backstage/plugin-techdocs-backend
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2024-45815Prototype pollution in @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2021-32662TechDocs mkdocs.yml path traversal
    26Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@backstage/plugin-techdocs-node1.13.11Package registry (OSV)
npm:@backstage/plugin-techdocs-node1.14.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records