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CVE-2026-101911· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

ip-address: Address6 builds a parse diagnostic proportional to the input with no length bound, allowing a single long string to stall or crash the process

ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.7.1, the Address6 constructor, Address6.isValid, and parse code in src/ipv6.ts accept unbounded strings and expand invalid characters through RE_BAD_CHARACTERS into large diagnostics. Material impact occurs only when an application accepts a very large attacker-controlled field and passes it to Address6 parsing without an earlier length bound. Common URL and header limits, and common body-parser defaults, generally constrain the effect; common defaults typically exclude 32 MiB fields. Megabyte-scale fields can cause a synchronous stall and high transient memory use, approximately 16 MiB can trigger an invalid string length exception, and process termination occurs at approximately 32 MiB. The affected entry points include Address6.isValid and construction paths that reach parse. This issue is fixed in version 10.7.1.

MediumCVSS 6.3 · v4.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Sep 28, 2026
Updated
Oct 1, 2026
EPSS
0.3% · 21th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

25

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
25 / 40 · 6.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.3%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
6.3
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • beaugunderson ip-address

    • < 10.7.1affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:12node-ip-addressall versions—
Debian:14node-ip-addressbefore 10.7.2-110.7.2-1
npmip-addressbefore 10.7.110.7.1

Same product

beaugunderson: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-69192ip-address: Address4 decodes leading-zero octets as decimal while resolvers decode them as octal, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-101910ip-address: no classifier recognizes the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass
    27Monitor
  • CVE-2026-69198ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks
    27Monitor
  • CVE-2026-54272ip-address: Misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks
    27Monitor
  • CVE-2026-101913ip-address: Address6.isLinkLocal() recognizes fe80::/64 rather than fe80::/10, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass to on-link hosts
    25Monitor
  • CVE-2026-101912ip-address: isInSubnet() and isHostInSubnet() compare addresses of different families as if they shared an address space, allowing an allowlist check to admit a
    25Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
beaugunderson ip-address10.7.1 · descriptionVendor (CNA)
debian:node-ip-address10.7.2-1 · Debian:14Package registry (OSV)
npm:ip-address10.7.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. Fix recordedsame day
  3. TodayOct 8, 2026+10 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
X

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-400 · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd-secondary

Root cause

Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-400 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
function expand(node) {  return node.children.map(expand);}

Fixed

ts
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;function expand(node, depth = 0) {  if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");  return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Change log

  1. SSVC exploitation— → poc
  2. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records