Bypass of namespace restrictions in CiliumNetworkPolicy
Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. An attacker with the ability to create or modify CiliumNetworkPolicy objects in a particular namespace is able to affect traffic on an entire Cilium cluster, potentially bypassing policy enforcement in other namespaces. By using a crafted `endpointSelector` that uses the `DoesNotExist` operator on the `reserved:init` label, the attacker can create policies that bypass namespace restrictions and affect the entire Cilium cluster. This includes potentially allowing or denying all traffic. This attack requires API server access, as described in the Kubernetes API Server Attacker section of the Cilium Threat Model. This issue has been resolved in Cilium versions 1.14.2, 1.13.7, and 1.12.14. As a workaround an admission webhook can be used to prevent the use of `endpointSelectors` that use the `DoesNotExist` operator on the `reserved:init` label in CiliumNetworkPolicies.
- Published
- Sep 27, 2023
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.5% · 40th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-306
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Report tools
Action score
32
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.5%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 8.1
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 6.9
- 1.2 point gap
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:H
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| cilium | cilium | cpe:2.3:a:cilium:cilium |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- cilium ciliumbefore 1.12.14
- cilium cilium1.13.0 and later · before 1.13.7
- cilium cilium1.14.0 and later · before 1.14.2
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
cilium cilium
- >= 1.14.0, < 1.14.2, >= 1.13.0, < 1.13.7, < 1.12.14affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cilium/cilium | from 1.13.0 · before 1.13.7 | 1.13.7 |
| Go | github.com/cilium/cilium | from 1.14.0 · before 1.14.2 | 1.14.2 |
| Go | github.com/cilium/cilium | before 1.12.14 | 1.12.14 |
Same product
cilium: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2023-27595Cilium eBPF filters may be temporarily removed during agent restart39Monitor
- CVE-2023-39347Cilium NetworkPolicy bypass via pod labels36Monitor
- CVE-2026-56742Cilium: Namespaced HTTPRoutes can redirect traffic to other namespaces35Monitor
- CVE-2026-49445Cilium: Sensitive information disclosure and cluster disruption via local Envoy admin socket access35Monitor
- CVE-2024-47825CIDR deny policies may not take effect when a more narrow CIDR allow is present34Monitor
- CVE-2022-29179Improper Privilege Management in Cilium32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/cilium/cilium | 1.12.14 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Go:github.com/cilium/cilium | 1.13.7 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Go:github.com/cilium/cilium | 1.14.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- Administrator privileges are required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-306 · Missing Authentication for Critical FunctionCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
A function added for development or support ships to production without authentication. It often relies on the assumption that it is “only reachable from the internal network.”
The bug in code
The whole CWE-306 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
// Added for the support teamapp.post("/maintenance/reset", resetDevice);Fixed
if (config.maintenanceEnabled) { app.post( "/maintenance/reset", requireSession, requireRole("admin"), resetDevice );}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/threat-model/#kubernetes-api-server-attacker
- github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/28007
- github.com/cilium/cilium/security/advisories/GHSA-4xp2-w642-7mcx
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.