Recovery codes abuse in SFTPGo
SFTPGo is configurable SFTP server with optional HTTP/S, FTP/S and WebDAV support. SFTPGo WebAdmin and WebClient support login using TOTP (Time-based One Time Passwords) as a secondary authentication factor. Because TOTPs are often configured on mobile devices that can be lost, stolen or damaged, SFTPGo also supports recovery codes. These are a set of one time use codes that can be used instead of the TOTP. In SFTPGo versions from version 2.2.0 to 2.3.3 recovery codes can be generated before enabling two-factor authentication. An attacker who knows the user's password could potentially generate some recovery codes and then bypass two-factor authentication after it is enabled on the account at a later time. This issue has been fixed in version 2.3.4. Recovery codes can now only be generated after enabling two-factor authentication and are deleted after disabling it.
- Published
- Sep 2, 2022
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.5% · 43th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-287
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Report tools
Action score
32
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.5%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 8.1
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 8.3
- 0.2 point gap
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| sftpgo project | sftpgo | cpe:2.3:a:sftpgo_project:sftpgo |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- sftpgo project sftpgo2.2.0 and later · before 2.3.4
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
drakkan sftpgo
- >= 2.2.0, < 2.3.4affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/drakkan/sftpgo | all versions | — |
| Go | github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/v2 | from 2.2.0 · before 2.3.4 | 2.3.4 |
Same product
sftpgo project: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2022-39220XSS Vulnerabilities in WebClient24Monitor
- CVE-2026-30915SFTPGo improperly sanitizes placeholders in group home directories/key prefixes21Monitor
- CVE-2026-30914SFTPGo has a Path Traversal and Permission Bypass via Path Normalization Discrepancy21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| drakkan sftpgo | 2.3.4 · description | Vendor (CNA) |
| Go:github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/v2 | 2.3.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-287 · Improper AuthenticationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-287 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);Fixed
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Authentication AbuseCAPEC-114Medium
- Authentication BypassCAPEC-115Medium
- Identity SpoofingCAPEC-151likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Fake the Source of DataCAPEC-194Medium
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive DataCAPEC-57likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Session HijackingCAPEC-593likelihood: High · Very High
- Token ImpersonationCAPEC-633Medium
ATT&CK techniques
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.