The ABB HMI components implement hidden administrative accounts that are used during the provisioning phase of the HMI interface.
The ABB HMI components implement hidden administrative accounts that are used during the provisioning phase of the HMI interface. These credentials allow the provisioning tool "Panel Builder 600" to flash a new interface and Tags (MODBUS coils) mapping to the HMI. These credentials are the idal123 password for the IdalMaster account, and the exor password for the exor account. These credentials are used over both HTTP(S) and FTP. There is no option to disable or change these undocumented credentials. An attacker can use these credentials to login to ABB HMI to read/write HMI configuration files and also to reset the device. This affects ABB CP635 HMI, CP600 HMIClient, Panel Builder 600, IDAL FTP server, IDAL HTTP server, and multiple other HMI components.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
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We use this product, ask for help- Published
- Jun 27, 2019
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 2.9% · 86th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-798
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Report tools
Action score
36
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 2.9%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| abb | cp620 firmware | cpe:2.3:o:abb:cp620_firmware |
| abb | cp620 | cpe:2.3:h:abb:cp620 |
| abb | cp620-web firmware | cpe:2.3:o:abb:cp620-web_firmware |
| abb | cp620-web | cpe:2.3:h:abb:cp620-web |
| abb | cp630 firmware | cpe:2.3:o:abb:cp630_firmware |
| abb | cp630 | cpe:2.3:h:abb:cp630 |
| abb | cp630-web firmware | cpe:2.3:o:abb:cp630-web_firmware |
| abb | cp630-web | cpe:2.3:h:abb:cp630-web |
| abb | cp635 firmware | cpe:2.3:o:abb:cp635_firmware |
| abb | cp635 | cpe:2.3:h:abb:cp635 |
| abb | cp635-b firmware | cpe:2.3:o:abb:cp635-b_firmware |
| abb | cp635-b | cpe:2.3:h:abb:cp635-b |
and 20 more
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- abb cp620 firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp620-web firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp630 firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp630-web firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp635 firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp635-b firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp635-web firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp651 firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp651-web firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp661 firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp661-web firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp665 firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp665-web firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp676 firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb cp676-web firmwareup to 1.76 inclusive
- abb pb610 firmware1.91 and later · up to 2.8.0.3674 inclusive
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
The product’s vendor appears in a public program. Matched by name; verify the scope text in the program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded CredentialsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-798 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";Fixed
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
- packetstormsecurity.com/files/153397/ABB-HMI-Hardcoded-Credentials.html
- seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Jun/38
- www.securityfocus.com/bid/108922
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.