Smart cards from the Athena SCS manufacturer, based on the Atmel Toolbox 00.03.11.05 and the AT90SC chip, contain a timing side channel in E
Smart cards from the Athena SCS manufacturer, based on the Atmel Toolbox 00.03.11.05 and the AT90SC chip, contain a timing side channel in ECDSA signature generation. This allows a local attacker, able to measure the duration of hundreds to thousands of signing operations, to compute the private key used. The issue occurs because the Atmel Toolbox 00.03.11.05 contains two versions of ECDSA signature functions, described as fast and secure, but the affected cards chose to use the fast version, which leaks the bit length of the random nonce via timing. This affects Athena IDProtect 010b.0352.0005, Athena IDProtect 010e.1245.0002, Athena IDProtect 0106.0130.0401, Athena IDProtect 010e.1245.0002, Valid S/A IDflex V 010b.0352.0005, SafeNet eToken 4300 010e.1245.0002, TecSec Armored Card 010e.0264.0001, and TecSec Armored Card 108.0264.0001.
- Published
- Oct 3, 2019
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.5% · 39th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-203
Sign in to follow · You’ll be notified if a followed record enters KEV, gets an exploit or is updated.
Report tools
Action score
18
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 18 / 40 · 4.7 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.5%
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| microchip | atmel toolbox | cpe:2.3:a:microchip:atmel_toolbox |
| athena-scs | idprotect | cpe:2.3:o:athena-scs:idprotect |
| cryptsoft | s\/a idflex v | cpe:2.3:o:cryptsoft:s\/a_idflex_v |
| tecsec | armored card | cpe:2.3:o:tecsec:armored_card |
| thalesgroup | etoken 4300 | cpe:2.3:o:thalesgroup:etoken_4300 |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- athena-scs idprotect0106.0130.0401
- athena-scs idprotect010b.0352.0005
- athena-scs idprotect010e.1245.0002
- cryptsoft s/a idflex v010b.0352.0005
- microchip atmel toolbox00.03.11.05
- tecsec armored card010e.0264.0001
- tecsec armored card108.0264.0001
- thalesgroup etoken 4300010e.1245.0002
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-203 · Observable DiscrepancyCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/02/2
- csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/details?source=ECDSA&number=214
- eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
- tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7337
- www.ssi.gouv.fr/certification_cc/bibliotheque-cryptographique-atmel-toolbox-00-03-11-05/
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.