An issue was discovered in myStrom WiFi Switch V1 before 2.66, WiFi Switch V2 before 3.80, WiFi Switch EU before 3.80, WiFi Bulb before 2.58
An issue was discovered in myStrom WiFi Switch V1 before 2.66, WiFi Switch V2 before 3.80, WiFi Switch EU before 3.80, WiFi Bulb before 2.58, WiFi LED Strip before 3.80, WiFi Button before 2.73, and WiFi Button Plus before 2.73. The process of registering a device with a cloud account was based on an activation code derived from the device MAC address. By guessing valid MAC addresses or using MAC addresses printed on devices in shops and reverse engineering the protocol, an attacker would have been able to register previously unregistered devices to their account. When the rightful owner would have connected them after purchase to their WiFi network, the devices would not have registered with their account, would subsequently not have been controllable from the owner's mobile app, and would not have been visible in the owner's account. Instead, they would have been under control of the attacker.
- Published
- Aug 30, 2018
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.9% · 57th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-287
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Report tools
Action score
32
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.9%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| mystrom | wifi switch firmware | cpe:2.3:o:mystrom:wifi_switch_firmware |
| mystrom | wifi switch | cpe:2.3:h:mystrom:wifi_switch |
| mystrom | wifi button plus firmware | cpe:2.3:o:mystrom:wifi_button_plus_firmware |
| mystrom | wifi button plus | cpe:2.3:h:mystrom:wifi_button_plus |
| mystrom | wifi button firmware | cpe:2.3:o:mystrom:wifi_button_firmware |
| mystrom | wifi button | cpe:2.3:h:mystrom:wifi_button |
| mystrom | wifi switch eu firmware | cpe:2.3:o:mystrom:wifi_switch_eu_firmware |
| mystrom | wifi switch eu | cpe:2.3:h:mystrom:wifi_switch_eu |
| mystrom | wifi bulb firmware | cpe:2.3:o:mystrom:wifi_bulb_firmware |
| mystrom | wifi bulb | cpe:2.3:h:mystrom:wifi_bulb |
| mystrom | wifi led strip firmware | cpe:2.3:o:mystrom:wifi_led_strip_firmware |
| mystrom | wifi led strip | cpe:2.3:h:mystrom:wifi_led_strip |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- mystrom wifi bulb firmwarebefore 2.58
- mystrom wifi button firmwarebefore 2.73
- mystrom wifi button plus firmwarebefore 2.73
- mystrom wifi led strip firmwarebefore 3.80
- mystrom wifi switch eu firmwarebefore 3.80
- mystrom wifi switch firmwarebefore 2.66
- mystrom wifi switch firmwarebefore 3.80
Same product
mystrom: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2018-15477myStrom WiFi Switch V1 devices before 2.66 did not sanitize a parameter received from the cloud that was used in an OS command.39Monitor
- CVE-2018-15480An issue was discovered in myStrom WiFi Switch V1 before 2.66, WiFi Switch V2 before 3.80, WiFi Switch EU before 3.80, WiFi Bulb before 2.5835Monitor
- CVE-2018-15476An issue was discovered in myStrom WiFi Switch V1 before 2.66, WiFi Switch V2 before 3.80, WiFi Switch EU before 3.80, WiFi Bulb before 2.5832Monitor
- CVE-2018-15479An issue was discovered in myStrom WiFi Switch V1 before 2.66, WiFi Switch V2 before 3.80, WiFi Switch EU before 3.80, WiFi Bulb before 2.5826Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-287 · Improper AuthenticationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-287 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);Fixed
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Authentication AbuseCAPEC-114Medium
- Authentication BypassCAPEC-115Medium
- Identity SpoofingCAPEC-151likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Fake the Source of DataCAPEC-194Medium
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive DataCAPEC-57likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Session HijackingCAPEC-593likelihood: High · Very High
- Token ImpersonationCAPEC-633Medium
ATT&CK techniques
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.