An issue was discovered in adns before 1.5.2.
An issue was discovered in adns before 1.5.2. adns_rr_info mishandles a bogus *datap. The general pattern for formatting integers is to sprintf into a fixed-size buffer. This is correct if the input is in the right range; if it isn't, the buffer may be overrun (depending on the sizes of the types on the current platform). Of course the inputs ought to be right. And there are pointers in there too, so perhaps one could say that the caller ought to check these things. It may be better to require the caller to make the pointer structure right, but to have the code here be defensive about (and tolerate with an error but without crashing) out-of-range integer values. So: it should defend each of these integer conversion sites with a check for the actual permitted range, and return adns_s_invaliddata if not. The lack of this check causes the SOA sign extension bug to be a serious security problem: the sign extended SOA value is out of range, and overruns the buffer when reconverted. This is related to sign extending SOA 32-bit integer fields, and use of a signed data type.
- Published
- Jun 18, 2020
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.9% · 79th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-119
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Report tools
Action score
31
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 1.9%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| gnu | adns | cpe:2.3:a:gnu:adns |
| fedoraproject | fedora | cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- fedoraproject fedora31
- fedoraproject fedora32
- gnu adnsbefore 1.5.2
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | adns | before 1.6.0-2 | 1.6.0-2 |
| openSUSE:Leap 15.1 | adns | before 1.5.1-lp151.3.3.1 | 1.5.1-lp151.3.3.1 |
| SUSE:HPE Helion OpenStack 8 | adns | before 1.4-103.3.1 | 1.4-103.3.1 |
| SUSE:Linux Enterprise Point of Sale 11 SP3 | adns | before 1.4-75.3.1 | 1.4-75.3.1 |
Same product
gnu: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2017-9104An issue was discovered in adns before 1.5.2.40Plan
- CVE-2017-9103An issue was discovered in adns before 1.5.2.40Plan
- CVE-2017-9109An issue was discovered in adns before 1.5.2.40Plan
- CVE-2017-9105An issue was discovered in adns before 1.5.2.36Monitor
- CVE-2017-9108An issue was discovered in adns before 1.5.2.31Monitor
- CVE-2017-9107An issue was discovered in adns before 1.5.2.31Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| debian:adns | 1.6.0-2 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
| opensuse:adns | 1.5.1-lp151.3.3.1 · openSUSE:Leap 15.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
| suse:adns | 1.4-75.3.1 · SUSE:Linux Enterprise Point of Sale 11 SP3 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-119 · Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory BufferCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Buffer Overflow via Environment VariablesCAPEC-10likelihood: High · High
- Overflow BuffersCAPEC-100likelihood: High · Very High
- Buffer ManipulationCAPEC-123likelihood: High · Very High
- Client-side Injection-induced Buffer OverflowCAPEC-14likelihood: Medium · High
- Filter Failure through Buffer OverflowCAPEC-24likelihood: High · High
- MIME ConversionCAPEC-42likelihood: High · High
- Overflow Binary Resource FileCAPEC-44likelihood: High · Very High
- Buffer Overflow via Symbolic LinksCAPEC-45likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
- www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/ucgi/~ianmdlvl/git?p=adns.git
- www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/ucgi/~ianmdlvl/git?p=adns.git%3Ba=blob%3Bf=changelog
- lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TRVHN3GGVNQWAOL3PWC5FLAV7HUESLZR/
- lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UGFZ4SPV6KFQK6ZNUZFB5Y32OYFOM5YJ/
- www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/adns-announce/2020/000004.html
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.