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CVE-2017-11436· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

D-Link DIR-615 before v20.12PTb04 has a second admin account with a 0x1 BACKDOOR value, which might allow remote attackers to obtain access

D-Link DIR-615 before v20.12PTb04 has a second admin account with a 0x1 BACKDOOR value, which might allow remote attackers to obtain access via a TELNET connection.

CriticalCVSS 9.8 · v3.1—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Jul 19, 2017
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
2.0% · 80th percentile
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JSON

Action score

40

Plan

Add it to your regular patch cycle.

CVSS
39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 2.0%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
dlinkdir-615

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • dlink dir-615up to 20.12ptb01 inclusive

Same product

dlink: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2017-7406The D-Link DIR-615 device before v20.12PTb04 doesn't use SSL for any of the authenticated pages.
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2017-7405On the D-Link DIR-615 before v20.12PTb04, once authenticated, this device identifies the user based on the IP address of his machine.
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2017-7404On the D-Link DIR-615 before v20.12PTb04, if a victim logged in to the Router's Web Interface visits a malicious site from another Browser t
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2009-4821The D-Link DIR-615 with firmware 3.10NA does not require administrative authentication for apply.cgi, which allows remote attackers to (1) c
    20Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded Credentials

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-798 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";

Fixed

ts
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

We use this product, ask for help

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records