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CVE-2014-0604· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

Directory traversal vulnerability in the rftpcom.dll ActiveX control in Attachmate Reflection FTP Client before 14.1.429 allows remote attac

Directory traversal vulnerability in the rftpcom.dll ActiveX control in Attachmate Reflection FTP Client before 14.1.429 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors to the StartLog method.

CriticalCVSS 10.0 · v2.0—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Feb 6, 2015
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
6.3% · 93th percentile
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Action score

42

Plan

Add it to your regular patch cycle.

CVSS
40 / 40 · 10.0 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
2 / 30 · 6.3%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
attachmatereflection ftp client

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • attachmate reflection ftp clientup to 14.1.420 inclusive

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2014-0605Directory traversal vulnerability in the rftpcom.dll ActiveX control in Attachmate Reflection FTP Client before 14.1.429 allows remote attac
    42Plan
  • CVE-2014-0603The rftpcom.dll ActiveX control in Attachmate Reflection FTP Client before 14.1.429 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (me
    42Plan
  • CVE-2014-5211Stack-based buffer overflow in the Attachmate Reflection FTP Client before 14.1.433 allows remote FTP servers to execute arbitrary code via
    28Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
C · data can be read
Integrity
C · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
C · the service can be disrupted
Attack complexity
Low
Confidentiality impact
C
Integrity impact
C
Availability impact
C

CVSS vector

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

We use this product, ask for help

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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