Lynx does not verify that the server's certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers
Lynx does not verify that the server's certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof SSL servers via a crafted certificate, related to improper use of a certain GnuTLS function.
- Published
- Nov 4, 2012
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.8% · 55th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-295
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Report tools
Action score
23
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 23 / 40 · 5.9 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.8%
Affected systems
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- canonical ubuntu linux10.04
- canonical ubuntu linux11.10
- canonical ubuntu linux12.04
- canonical ubuntu linux12.10
- lynx lynxall versions
Same product
lynx: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2008-4690lynx 2.8.6dev.15 and earlier, when advanced mode is enabled and lynx is configured as a URL handler, allows remote attackers to execute arbi42Plan
- CVE-2016-9179lynx: It was found that Lynx doesn't parse the authority component of the URL correctly when the host name part ends with '?', and could ins31Monitor
- CVE-2010-2810Heap-based buffer overflow in the convert_to_idna function in WWW/Library/Implementation/HTParse.c in Lynx 2.8.8dev.1 through 2.8.8dev.4 all28Monitor
- CVE-2006-7234Untrusted search path vulnerability in Lynx before 2.8.6rel.4 allows local users to execute arbitrary code via malicious (1) .mailcap and (218Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-295 · Improper Certificate ValidationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-295 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) { // Left empty for the test environment}Fixed
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder() .certificatePinner( CertificatePinner.Builder() .add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…") .build() ).build()Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
- www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2013:101
- www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1642-1
- exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/79930
- wiki.mageia.org/en/Support/Advisories/MGASA-2012-0351
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.