ecryptfs-utils: suid helper does not restrict mounting filesystems with nosuid,nodev which creates a possible privilege escalation
- Published
- Dec 20, 2019
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 33th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-20
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Report tools
Action score
31
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 31 / 40 · 7.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| ecryptfs | ecryptfs-utils | cpe:2.3:a:ecryptfs:ecryptfs-utils |
| debian | debian linux | cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- debian debian linux8.0
- debian debian linux9.0
- ecryptfs ecryptfs-utils86 and later · before 99
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (redhat). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
ecryptfs-utils ecryptfs-utils
- < 99affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | ecryptfs-utils | before 99-1 | 99-1 |
Same product
ecryptfs: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2016-1572mount.ecryptfs_private.c in eCryptfs-utils does not validate mount destination filesystem types, which allows local users to gain privileges33Monitor
- CVE-2014-9687eCryptfs 104 and earlier uses a default salt to encrypt the mount passphrase, which makes it easier for attackers to obtain user passwords v21Monitor
- CVE-2011-1836utils/ecryptfs-recover-private in ecryptfs-utils before 90 does not establish a subdirectory with safe permissions, which might allow local 18Monitor
- CVE-2011-1831utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c in ecryptfs-utils before 90 does not properly check mountpoint permissions, which allows local users to effec18Monitor
- CVE-2011-1835The encrypted private-directory setup process in utils/ecryptfs-setup-private in ecryptfs-utils before 90 does not properly ensure that the 17Monitor
- CVE-2011-1837The lock-counter implementation in utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c in ecryptfs-utils before 90 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary file14Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| debian:ecryptfs-utils | 99-1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-20 · Improper Input ValidationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Buffer Overflow via Environment VariablesCAPEC-10likelihood: High · High
- Server Side Include (SSI) InjectionCAPEC-101likelihood: High · High
- Cross Zone ScriptingCAPEC-104likelihood: Medium · High
- Command Line Execution through SQL InjectionCAPEC-108likelihood: Low · Very High
- Object Relational Mapping InjectionCAPEC-109likelihood: Low · High
- SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter TamperingCAPEC-110likelihood: High · Very High
- Double EncodingCAPEC-120likelihood: Low · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
ATT&CK techniques
- Obfuscated Files or InformationT1027
- Masquerading: Invalid Code SignatureT1036.001
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Subvert Trust Controls: Code SigningT1553.002
- Impair Defenses:Impair Command History LoggingT1562.003
- Hijack Execution Flow:Dynamic Linker HijackingT1574.006
- Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableT1574.007
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/07/11/23
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/07/12/1
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/07/13/5
- access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2012-3409
- bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2012-3409
- security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2012-3409
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.