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CVE-2026-91085· CVE.org (no NVD analysis yet)· CNA apache

Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

—No exploit Fix available
Published
Sep 29, 2026
Updated
Sep 29, 2026
EPSS
0.2% · 5th percentile
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CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.2%

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Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Apache Software Foundation Apache Karaf

    • before 4.4.12affected · semver

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-91006Apache Karaf: OS Command Injection in Child-Instance Launch (instance:* / InstancesMBean)
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-92230Apache Karaf: Improper release of ClassLoader references via static ThreadLocal caching
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-90979Apache Karaf: LDAP filter injection in JAAS LDAP login modules
    29Monitor
  • CVE-2026-92142Apache Karaf: Authorization bypass in JMX MBean lifecycle operations
    0Monitor
  • CVE-2026-91048Apache Karaf: Missing authorization on the jdbc:* shell command scope allows privilege escalation to remote code execution via jdbc:ds-create
    0Monitor
  • CVE-2026-91012Apache Karaf: Path Traversal in Config Service Allows Manager-to-Admin Privilege Escalation
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Apache Software Foundation Apache Karaf4.4.12Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

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Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. Fix recordedsame day
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+2 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

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Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-910480 days apartApache Karaf: Missing authorization on the jdbc:* shell command scope allows privilege escalation to remote code execution via jdbc:ds-create
    0Monitor
  • CVE-2026-921420 days apartApache Karaf: Authorization bypass in JMX MBean lifecycle operations
    0Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

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No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

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Change log

  1. Exploit maturity— → none
  2. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

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