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CVE-2026-8023· NVD / CVE Program· CNA zephyr

Path traversal in Zephyr HTTP server static-filesystem resource handler allows unauthenticated remote arbitrary file read

Zephyr's HTTP server (subsys/net/lib/http) provides a static-filesystem resource type (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS, available when CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM is enabled) that serves files from a configured root directory. Before this fix, both the HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 front-ends placed the raw, attacker-controlled request path into client->url_buffer (assembled in on_url() for HTTP/1 and copied verbatim from the :path pseudo-header for HTTP/2) without resolving ./.. segments. The static-FS handler then built the on-disk filename by directly concatenating the configured root with that raw URL (snprintk(fname, ..., "%s%s", static_fs_detail->fs_path, client->url_buffer) at http_server_http1.c:603 and http_server_http2.c:490) and opened it with fs_open(fname, FS_O_READ). Because the handler is reached via wildcard/leading-dir (fnmatch FNM_LEADING_DIR) or fallback resource matching, a request such as GET /<prefix>/../../<file> is dispatched to the handler and, after the underlying filesystem (e.g. LittleFS/FAT) resolves the .. segments, escapes the configured web root, letting an unauthenticated remote client read arbitrary readable files on the mounted volume (information disclosure). The HTTP server requires no TLS or authentication to reach this path. The fix adds http_server_remove_dot_segments(), which canonicalizes the path portion of the URL before resource lookup in both protocol handlers, neutralizing the traversal. Affects releases v4.0.0 through v4.4.0 for deployments that register a static-filesystem resource.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—Proof of concept Fix available
Published
Jun 29, 2026
Updated
Jul 17, 2026
EPSS
0.9% · 57th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.9%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · zephyr
7.5
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
zephyrprojectzephyr

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • zephyrproject zephyr4.0.0 and later · up to 4.4.1 inclusive

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (zephyr). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • zephyrproject zephyr

    • 4.0.0 and later · before 4.5.0affected · semver

Same product

zephyrproject: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2023-4260Potential off-by-one buffer overflow vulnerability in the Zephyr FS subsystem
    40Plan
  • CVE-2021-3625Buffer overflow in Zephyr USB DFU DNLOAD
    40Plan
  • CVE-2020-10071Insufficient publish message length validation in MQTT
    40Plan
  • CVE-2020-10070MQTT buffer overflow on receive buffer
    40Plan
  • CVE-2020-10062Packet length decoding error in MQTT
    40Plan
  • CVE-2020-10022UpdateHub Module Copies a Variable-Size Hash String Into a Fixed-Size Array
    40Plan

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
zephyrproject zephyr4.5.0Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02026-05-11

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. First PoC-50 d
  2. Published
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+93 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-22 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records