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CVE-2026-71867· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

Orval: RCE via schema property name -> computed-property-key injection in the MSW mock generator

Orval generates type-safe JavaScript clients in TypeScript from OpenAPI v3 and Swagger v2 specifications. Prior to 8.21.0, a single quote in a schema property name is emitted into single-quoted object keys in generated MSW mock factories without safe encoding. This permits attacker-controlled JavaScript to be evaluated when the generated mock factory is called by tests or an MSW handler, resulting in code execution in the developer, CI, test, or application environment. The affected code is packages/core/src/getters/keys.ts function getKey and MSW mock generation. This issue is fixed in version 8.21.0.

CriticalCVSS 9.3 · v4.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Aug 19, 2026
Updated
Sep 9, 2026
EPSS
0.7% · 49th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

37

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
37 / 40 · 9.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.7%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
9.3
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • orval-labs orval

    • < 8.21.0affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmorvalbefore 8.21.08.21.0

Same product

orval-labs: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-96759orval before 8.29.0 Code Injection via operationId
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2026-96754orval @orval/hono before 8.29.0 Code Injection via OpenAPI Path
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2026-96758orval @orval/core before 8.28.0 Code Injection via Form-Data
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2026-96757orval before 8.29.0 Code Injection via unescaped OpenAPI media-type
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2026-96755orval @orval/effect 8.14.0 through 8.28.1 Code Injection
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2026-72717Orval: Import-time RCE via schema default -> zod module-level template literal
    37Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
orval-labs orval8.21.0 · descriptionVendor (CNA)
npm:orval8.21.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-718660 days apartOrval: Import-time RCE via schema property name -> computed-property-key injection in the zod client
    37Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
X

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-89 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd-secondary

Root cause

The query text is built by concatenating user input. The database cannot tell where the data ends and the command begins.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-89 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query(  "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = '" + owner + "'");

Fixed

ts
const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query(  "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = $1",  [owner]);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records