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CVE-2026-66077· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

RabbitMQ: Stored XSS via TLS peer-certificate DN in management UI

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, The management UI uses EJS 1.0 in which <%= ... %> does NOT HTML-escape. connection.ejs:135 renders <%= connection.ssl_details.peer_cert_subject %> (and peer_cert_issuer) directly into the page. The same pattern appears in streamConnection.ejs:102,106,110. The values come from rabbit_ssl:peer_cert_subject/1 which formats the DN as a string without HTML escaping. The verifier corrected the original researcher's claim: this is reachable only when the listener is configured with verify_peer (so the certificate must be signed by a CA in the broker's trust store, not arbitrary self-signed); however, in deployments using mTLS for client authentication, any user who can request a certificate from the organisational CA controls the Subject CN. An attacker who can obtain a TLS client certificate signed by a CA the broker trusts (with verify_peer enabled) can embed JavaScript in the certificate's Subject DN. When any administrator views that connection in the management UI, the script executes in the admin's browser session, allowing full account takeover (create users, export definitions, etc.). The management UI's CSP includes 'unsafe-inline', so inline script execution is not blocked. Preconditions include TLS listener configured with ssl_options.verify = verify_peer Attacker can obtain a CA-signed client certificate with attacker-chosen Subject (e.g. self-service corporate PKI, or rabbitmq_trust_store plugin in use) Administrator views the connection detail page. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.

HighCVSS 7.3 · v4.0—No exploit Fix available

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Published
Sep 23, 2026
Updated
Sep 29, 2026
EPSS
0.3% · 20th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

29

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
29 / 40 · 7.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.3%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
7.3
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • rabbitmq rabbitmq-server

    • >= 3.13.0, < 3.13.15, >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.20, >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.11, >= 4.2.0, < 4.2.6affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:12rabbitmq-serverall versions—
Debian:14rabbitmq-serverbefore 4.3.0-24.3.0-2
Red Hat:hummingbird:1rabbitmq-server4.3before 0:4.3.6-1.hum10:4.3.6-1.hum1

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-67404RabbitMQ: OAuth2 silent verify_none fallback for JWKS fetch
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-67231RabbitMQ: Trust-store whitelist by Issuer+Serial only
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-67410RabbitMQ: OAuth2 Client Secret Exposed via Unauthenticated JavaScript Endpoint
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2026-67409RabbitMQ: JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2026-67236RabbitMQ: Plaintext username:password stored in an insecure cookie after successful POST /login
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2026-66079RabbitMQ: Pre-auth AMQP 1.0 array32 zero-width element DoS
    32Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
debian:rabbitmq-server4.3.0-2 · Debian:14Package registry (OSV)
red hat:rabbitmq-server4.30:4.3.6-1.hum1 · Red Hat:hummingbird:1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-672372 days apartRabbitMQ: Reflected XSS via the OAuth bootstrap JS endpoint
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-672392 days apartRabbitMQ: Stored XSS via TLS peer-certificate DN in stream-management UI
    30Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
A
Scope
X

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd-secondary

Root cause

User content is inserted into the page as HTML. The browser interprets the content as code rather than data.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
commentEl.innerHTML = comment.body;

Fixed

ts
commentEl.textContent = comment.body;

Change log

  1. SSVC exploitation— → none
  2. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

All records