MessagePack-CSharp: Multi-dimensional array formatters allocate from unchecked dimensions
MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, MessagePack-CSharp's multi-dimensional array formatters read dimension lengths directly from the payload and allocate T[,], T[,,], or T[,,,] before validating that the dimension product matches the encoded element count. The formatter reads a guarded element array header, but allocation of the target multi-dimensional array happens before the dimensions are checked against that element count. A small payload can therefore declare large dimensions, provide an empty or tiny inner array, and cause a large heap allocation before element data is validated. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
- Published
- Jun 22, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 32th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-770
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Report tools
Action score
25
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 25 / 40 · 6.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 6.3
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| messagepack | messagepack | cpe:2.3:a:messagepack:messagepack |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- messagepack messagepackbefore 2.5.301
- messagepack messagepack3.0.3 and later · before 3.1.7
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
MessagePack-CSharp MessagePack-CSharp
- >= 3.0, < 3.1.7, < 2.5.301affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| NuGet | MessagePack | from 3.0 · before 3.1.7 | 3.1.7 |
| NuGet | MessagePack | before 2.5.301 | 2.5.301 |
Same product
messagepack: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-48502MessagePack-CSharp: Denial of service vulnerabilities can swamp the CPU or crash the process with stack and heap overflows32Monitor
- CVE-2026-48109MessagePack-CSharp: LZ4 decompression may fail with AccessViolationException after dereferencing memory from bad input32Monitor
- CVE-2026-48506MessagePack-CSharp: MessagePackReader.Skip can recurse without enforcing maximum object graph depth30Monitor
- CVE-2020-5234Untrusted data can lead to DoS attack in MessagePack for C# and Unity26Monitor
- CVE-2026-48517MessagePack-CSharp: Typeless deserialization type restrictions do not recurse into arrays or generic arguments25Monitor
- CVE-2026-48516MessagePack-CSharp: InterfaceLookupFormatter bypasses collision-resistant comparer settings25Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| MessagePack-CSharp MessagePack-CSharp | 2.5.301 · description | Vendor (CNA) |
| NuGet:MessagePack | 2.5.301 | Package registry (OSV) |
| NuGet:MessagePack | 3.1.7 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-485140 days apartMessagePack-CSharp: Unity unsafe blit formatter allocates from unbounded byte length25Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-770 · Allocation of Resources Without Limits or ThrottlingCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- FloodingCAPEC-125likelihood: High · Medium
- Excessive AllocationCAPEC-130likelihood: Medium · Medium
- XML Ping of the DeathCAPEC-147likelihood: Low · Medium
- Exponential Data ExpansionCAPEC-197likelihood: High · Medium
- Serialized Data Parameter BlowupCAPEC-229likelihood: High · High
- Serialized Data with Nested PayloadsCAPEC-230likelihood: Medium · High
- Oversized Serialized Data PayloadsCAPEC-231likelihood: Medium · High
- HTTP DoSCAPEC-469Low
ATT&CK techniques
- Network Denial of Service:Direct Network FloodT1498.001
- Network Denial of Service:Reflection AmplificationT1498.002
- Endpoint Denial of ServiceT1499
- Endpoint Denial of Service: OS Exhaustion FloodT1499.001
- Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion FloodT1499.002
- Endpoint Denial of Service:Application Exhaustion FloodT1499.003
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.