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CVE-2026-47735· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks

Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc's user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. This is fixed in 2026.06.1 via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. Some workarounds are available. Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules or, as a temporary mitigation, add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go`.

HighCVSS 7.1 · v4.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Aug 21, 2026
Updated
Sep 9, 2026
EPSS
0.4% · 35th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

28

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
28 / 40 · 7.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.4%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
7.1
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Basekick-Labs arc

    • < 2026.06.1affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/basekick-labs/arcbefore 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a020.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-48050Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-48106Arc Enterprise cluster replication accepts unauthenticated MsgReplicateSync messages, enabling cluster-wide data injection from any TLS-trusted peer
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2026-48105Arc Enterprise cluster FSM applyRegisterFile accepts arbitrary file paths without validation, enabling cluster-wide path-traversal worm primitive
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2026-55678Arc: Unauthenticated cluster node admission when `cluster.shared_secret` is unset
    27Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Basekick-Labs arc2026.06.1 · descriptionVendor (CNA)
Go:github.com/basekick-labs/arc0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-481050 days apartArc Enterprise cluster FSM applyRegisterFile accepts arbitrary file paths without validation, enabling cluster-wide path-traversal worm primitive
    33Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

  • CVE-2026-480500 days apartArc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-481060 days apartArc Enterprise cluster replication accepts unauthenticated MsgReplicateSync messages, enabling cluster-wide data injection from any TLS-trusted peer
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2026-556787 days apartArc: Unauthenticated cluster node admission when `cluster.shared_secret` is unset
    27Monitor

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
X

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Noroxi analysis

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Change log

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References

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