Improper TLS Client/Server authentication and certificate verification on Database Cluster
A vulnerability was identified in Juju from version 3.2.0 until 3.6.19 and from version 4.0 until 4.0.4, where the internal Dqlite database cluster fails to perform proper TLS client and server authentication. Specifically, the Juju controller's database endpoint does not validate client certificates when a new node attempts to join the cluster. An unauthenticated attacker with network reachability to the Juju controller's Dqlite port can exploit this flaw to join the database cluster. Once joined, the attacker gains full read and write access to the underlying database, allowing for total data compromise.
- Published
- Apr 1, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 33th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-295
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Report tools
Action score
40
Plan
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 40 / 40 · 10.0 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · canonical
- 10.0
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| canonical | juju | cpe:2.3:a:canonical:juju |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- canonical juju3.2.0 and later · before 3.6.20
- canonical juju4.0 and later · before 4.0.5
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (canonical). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Canonical Juju
- 3.2.0 and later · before 3.6.20affected · semver
- 4.0 and later · before 4.0.4affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/juju/juju | up to and including 0.0.0-20260401092550-1c1ac1922b57 | — |
| Go | github.com/juju/juju | all versions | — |
Same product
canonical: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2017-9232Juju before 1.25.12, 2.0.x before 2.0.4, and 2.1.x before 2.1.3 uses a UNIX domain socket without setting appropriate permissions, allowing 54Plan
- CVE-2026-32693Unauthorized access to Kubernetes secrets in Juju35Monitor
- CVE-2025-0928Arbitrary executable upload via authenticated endpoint35Monitor
- CVE-2024-7558JUJU_CONTEXT_ID is a predictable authentication secret.32Monitor
- CVE-2015-1316Juju Joyent provider uploads user's private ssh key by default30Monitor
- CVE-2025-68153Juju: Resource poisoning28Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Canonical Juju | 3.6.20 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Canonical Juju | 4.0.4 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Harry Pidcockfinder
- Thomas Milleranalyst
- Joseph Phillipsremediation developer
- Ian Boothcoordinator
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-295 · Improper Certificate ValidationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Root cause
A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-295 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) { // Left empty for the test environment}Fixed
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder() .certificatePinner( CertificatePinner.Builder() .add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…") .build() ).build()Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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