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CVE-2026-33895· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

Forge has signature forgery in Ed25519 due to missing S > L check

Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, Ed25519 signature verification accepts forged non-canonical signatures where the scalar S is not reduced modulo the group order (`S >= L`). A valid signature and its `S + L` variant both verify in forge, while Node.js `crypto.verify` (OpenSSL-backed) rejects the `S + L` variant, as defined by the specification. This class of signature malleability has been exploited in practice to bypass authentication and authorization logic (see CVE-2026-25793, CVE-2022-35961). Applications relying on signature uniqueness (i.e., dedup by signature bytes, replay tracking, signed-object canonicalization checks) may be bypassed. Version 1.4.0 patches the issue.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

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Published
Mar 27, 2026
Updated
Sep 4, 2026
EPSS
0.5% · 38th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.5%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
7.5
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
digitalbazaarforge

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • digitalbazaar forgeup to 1.3.3 inclusive

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • digitalbazaar forge

    • < 1.4.0affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmnode-forgebefore 1.4.01.4.0
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform_developer:2.5::el8python3.12-clickbefore 0:8.3.3-1.el8ap0:8.3.3-1.el8ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform_developer:2.5::el8python3.12-cryptographybefore 0:46.0.7-1.el8ap0:46.0.7-1.el8ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform_developer:2.5::el8receptorbefore 0:1.6.5-1.el8ap0:1.6.5-1.el8ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform_developer:2.5::el9python3.12-clickbefore 0:8.3.3-1.el9ap0:8.3.3-1.el9ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform_developer:2.5::el9python3.12-cryptographybefore 0:46.0.7-1.el9ap0:46.0.7-1.el9ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform_developer:2.5::el9receptorbefore 0:1.6.5-1.el9ap0:1.6.5-1.el9ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el8automation-controller-venv-towerbefore 0:4.6.29-2.el8ap0:4.6.29-2.el8ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el8automation-gateway-proxy-serverbefore 0:2.5.10-6.el8ap0:2.5.10-6.el8ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el8automation-gateway-serverbefore 0:2.5.20260422-3.el8ap0:2.5.20260422-3.el8ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el8python3.12-pillowbefore 0:12.2.0-1.el8ap0:12.2.0-1.el8ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el9automation-controller-venv-towerbefore 0:4.6.29-2.el9ap0:4.6.29-2.el9ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el9automation-gateway-proxy-serverbefore 0:2.6.14-3.el9ap0:2.6.14-3.el9ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el9automation-gateway-serverbefore 0:2.5.20260422-3.el9ap0:2.5.20260422-3.el9ap
Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el9python3.12-pillowbefore 0:12.2.0-1.el9ap0:12.2.0-1.el9ap

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-33896Forge has a basicConstraints bypass in its certificate chain verification (RFC 5280 violation)
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-85393node-forge through 1.4.0 RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Forgery via Nested DigestAlgorithm Padding
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2025-66031node-forge ASN.1 Unbounded Recursion
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2025-12816An interpretation-conflict (CWE-436) vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and earlier enables unauthenticated attackers to craft ASN.1
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2026-33894Forge has signature forgery in RSA-PKCS due to ASN.1 extra field
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-33891Forge has Denial of Service via Infinite Loop in BigInteger.modInverse() with Zero Input
    30Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:node-forge1.4.0Package registry (OSV)
red hat:automation-controller-venv-tower0:4.6.29-2.el8ap · Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el8Package registry (OSV)
red hat:automation-gateway-proxy-server0:2.5.10-6.el8ap · Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el8Package registry (OSV)
red hat:automation-gateway-server0:2.5.20260422-3.el8ap · Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el8Package registry (OSV)
red hat:python3.12-click0:8.3.3-1.el8ap · Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform_developer:2.5::el8Package registry (OSV)
red hat:python3.12-cryptography0:46.0.7-1.el8ap · Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform_developer:2.5::el8Package registry (OSV)
red hat:python3.12-pillow0:12.2.0-1.el8ap · Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform:2.5::el8Package registry (OSV)
red hat:receptor0:1.6.5-1.el8ap · Red Hat:ansible_automation_platform_developer:2.5::el8Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-85393160 days apartnode-forge through 1.4.0 RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Forgery via Nested DigestAlgorithm Padding
    34Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

nvd-secondary

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {  algorithms: ["RS256"],  issuer: "https://id.example.com",  audience: "portal",});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

All records