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CVE-2026-32310· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

Cryptomator: Unverified masterkeyfile key IDs can access arbitrary local or UNC paths

Cryptomator encrypts data being stored on cloud infrastructure. From version 1.6.0 to before version 1.19.1, vault configuration is parsed before its integrity is verified, and the masterkeyfile loader uses the unverified keyId as a filesystem path. The loader resolves keyId.getSchemeSpecificPart() directly against the vault path and immediately calls Files.exists(...). This allows a malicious vault config to supply parent-directory escapes, absolute local paths, or UNC paths (e.g., masterkeyfile://attacker/share/masterkey.cryptomator). On Windows, the UNC variant is especially dangerous because Path.resolve("//attacker/share/...") becomes \\attacker\share\..., so the existence check can trigger outbound SMB access before the user even enters a passphrase. This issue has been patched in version 1.19.1.

MediumCVSS 5.3 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Mar 20, 2026
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
0.4% · 27th percentile
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Action score

21

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.4%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
5.3
CNA · GitHub_M
4.1
1.2 point gap

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

VendorProduct
cryptomatorcryptomator
microsoftwindows

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • cryptomator cryptomator1.6.0 and later · up to 1.19.0 inclusive

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • cryptomator cryptomator

    • >= 1.6.0, <= 1.19.0affected

Same product

cryptomator: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-32309Cryptomator: Hub unlocking accepts plaintext HTTP and unvalidated endpoint schemes
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2023-39520Cryptomator vulnerable to Local Elevation of Privileges
    31Monitor
  • CVE-2023-37907Cryptomator's MSI installer allows local privilege escalation
    31Monitor
  • CVE-2022-25366Cryptomator through 1.6.5 allows DYLIB injection because, although it has the flag 0x1000 for Hardened Runtime, it has the com.apple.securit
    31Monitor
  • CVE-2026-32318Cryptomator for IOS: Tampered vault configuration allows MITM attack on Hub API
    23Monitor
  • CVE-2026-32317Cryptomator for Android: Tampered vault configuration allows MITM attack on Hub API
    23Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
cryptomator cryptomator1.19.1 · descriptionVendor (CNA)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-22 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records