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CVE-2025-9291· NVD / CVE Program· CNA TPLink

Improper Certificate Validation in TP-Link Omada Cloud Communications

A certification validation weakness exists in communication between affected Omada devices and cloud controllers. Certificate identity verification does not adequately validate that a presented certificate corresponds to the expected cloud controller hostname, which may allow certificate validation protections to be bypassed under specific conditions. Successful exploitation may allow interception or modification of communication between affected devices and cloud controllers.

HighCVSS 7.7 · v4.0—No exploit No fix recorded

Noroxi analysis

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Published
Aug 3, 2026
Updated
Sep 29, 2026
EPSS
0.2% · 11th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.7 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.2%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · TPLink
7.7
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
tp-linkomada fusion 2.5g firmware
tp-linkomada fusion 2.5g
tp-linkomada er707-m2 firmware
tp-linkomada er707-m2
tp-linkomada er7206 firmware
tp-linkomada er7206
tp-linkomada er706w firmware
tp-linkomada er706w
tp-linkomada er8411 firmware
tp-linkomada er8411
tp-linkomada er605 firmware
tp-linkomada er605

and 188 more

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • tp-link omada ds1008x firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds1016g firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds1016ge firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds1018gmp firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds1024g firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds105g firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds105g-m2 firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds105ge firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds105gp firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds105x firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds106gpp firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds106p firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds108g firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds108g-m2 firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds108ge firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds108gp firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds110gmp firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada ds111p firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada eap610 firmwareall versions
  • tp-link omada eap610-outdoor firmwareall versions

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (TPLink). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • TP-Link Systems Inc. Omada Access Points

    • 0affected
  • TP-Link Systems Inc. Omada Gateways

    • 0affected
  • TP-Link Systems Inc. Omada Switches

    • 0affected

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2025-15631Weak Credential Storage in TP-Link Omada Devices
    22Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
P
Scope
X

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

kotlin
override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) {  // Left empty for the test environment}

Fixed

kotlin
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder()  .certificatePinner(    CertificatePinner.Builder()      .add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…")      .build()  ).build()

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

All records