ruby-saml Libxml2 Canonicalization errors can bypass Digest/Signature validation
The ruby-saml library implements the client side of an SAML authorization. Versions up to and including 1.12.4, are vulnerable to authentication bypass through the libxml2 canonicalization process used by Nokogiri for document transformation, which allows an attacker to execute a Signature Wrapping attack. When libxml2’s canonicalization is invoked on an invalid XML input, it may return an empty string rather than a canonicalized node. ruby-saml then proceeds to compute the DigestValue over this empty string, treating it as if canonicalization succeeded. This issue is fixed in version 1.18.0.
- Published
- Dec 9, 2025
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 13th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-347
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Report tools
Action score
37
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 37 / 40 · 9.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 9.3
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| onelogin | ruby-saml | cpe:2.3:a:onelogin:ruby-saml |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- onelogin ruby-samlbefore 1.18.0
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
SAML-Toolkits ruby-saml
- < 1.18.0affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| RubyGems | ruby-saml | before 1.18.0 | 1.18.0 |
Same product
onelogin: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2024-45409The Ruby SAML library vulnerable to a SAML authentication bypass via Incorrect XPath selector42Plan
- CVE-2017-11428Multiple SAML libraries may allow authentication bypass via incorrect XML canonicalization and DOM traversal40Plan
- CVE-2015-20108xml_security.rb in the ruby-saml gem before 1.0.0 for Ruby allows XPath injection and code execution because prepared statements are not use39Monitor
- CVE-2025-66567ruby-saml has a SAML authentication bypass due to namespace handling (parser differential)37Monitor
- CVE-2016-5697Ruby-saml before 1.3.0 allows attackers to perform XML signature wrapping attacks via unspecified vectors.30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| SAML-Toolkits ruby-saml | 1.18.0 · description | Vendor (CNA) |
| RubyGems:ruby-saml | 1.18.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2024-45409455 days apartThe Ruby SAML library vulnerable to a SAML authentication bypass via Incorrect XPath selector42Plan
- CVE-2025-665670 days apartruby-saml has a SAML authentication bypass due to namespace handling (parser differential)37Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, { algorithms: ["RS256"], issuer: "https://id.example.com", audience: "portal",});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/commit/acac9e9cc0b9a507882c614f25d41f8b47be349a
- github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/security/advisories/GHSA-x4h9-gwv3-r4m4
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.