Apollo Router Core: Access Control Bypass on Polymorphic Types
Apollo Router Core is a configurable graph router written in Rust to run a federated supergraph using Apollo Federation 2. In versions 1.61.11 below, as well as 2.0.0-alpha.0 through 2.8.1-rc.0, a vulnerability allowed for unauthenticated queries to access data that required additional access controls. Router incorrectly handled access control directives on interface types/fields and their implementing object types/fields, applying them to interface types/fields while ignoring directives on their implementing object types/fields when all implementations had the same requirements. Apollo Router customers defining @authenticated, @requiresScopes, or @policy directives inconsistently on polymorphic types (i.e., object types that implement interface types) are impacted. This issue is fixed in versions 1.61.12 and 2.8.1.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for help- Published
- Nov 6, 2025
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 22th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-288
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Report tools
Action score
30
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 7.5
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Affected systems
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
apollographql router
- < 1.61.12, >= 2.8.1-rc.0, < 2.8.1affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | apollo-router | from 2.0.0-alpha.0 · before 2.8.1 | 2.8.1 |
| crates.io | apollo-router | before 1.61.12 | 1.61.12 |
Same product
apollographql: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2024-32971Defect in query plan cache may cause incorrect operations to be executed in Apollo Router36Monitor
- CVE-2025-64347Apollo Router Improperly Enforces Renamed Access Control Directives30Monitor
- CVE-2025-32380Apollo Router Query Validation Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Named Fragment Processing30Monitor
- CVE-2025-32034Apollo Router Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Named Fragment Expansion30Monitor
- CVE-2025-32033Apollo Router Operation Limits Vulnerable to Bypass via Integer Overflow30Monitor
- CVE-2025-32032Apollo Router Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Optimization Bypass30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:apollo-router | 1.61.12 | Package registry (OSV) |
| crates.io:apollo-router | 2.8.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-288 · Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or ChannelCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- github.com/apollographql/router/releases/tag/v2.8.1
- github.com/apollographql/router/security/advisories/GHSA-x33c-7c2v-mrj9
- www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/security/authorization#authorization-directives
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.