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CVE-2025-48413· NVD / CVE Program· CNA SEC-VLab

Hard-coded OS root credentials in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations

The `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` files reveal hard-coded password hashes for the operating system "root" user. The credentials are shipped with the update files. There is no option for deleting or changing their passwords for an enduser. An attacker can use the credentials to log into the device. Authentication can be performed via SSH backdoor or likely via physical access (UART shell).

HighCVSS 7.7 · v3.1—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
May 21, 2025
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
0.2% · 11th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.7 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.2%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (SEC-VLab). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations

    • <=2.2.0affected

Same product

echarge hardy barth: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2025-48416Backdoor Functionality via SSH in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2025-48417Hard-Coded Certificate and Private Key for HTTPS Web Interface in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2025-48414Hard-coded web interface credentials in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2025-27804OS Command Injection Vulnerability in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2025-27803Missing Authentication in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2025-48415Backdoor Functionality via USB Drive in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
    24Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2025-484140 days apartHard-coded web interface credentials in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
    26Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded Credentials

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd-secondary

Root cause

For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-798 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";

Fixed

ts
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records