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CVE-2024-47197· NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

Maven Archetype Plugin: Maven Archetype integration-test may package local settings into the published artifact, possibly containing credentials

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information vulnerability in Maven Archetype Plugin. This issue affects Maven Archetype Plugin: from 3.2.1 before 3.3.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.3.0, which fixes the issue. Archetype integration testing creates a file called ./target/classes/archetype-it/archetype-settings.xml This file contains all the content from the users ~/.m2/settings.xml file, which often contains information they do not want to publish. We expect that on many developer machines, this also contains credentials. When the user runs mvn verify again (without a mvn clean), this file becomes part of the final artifact. If a developer were to publish this into Maven Central or any other remote repository (whether as a release or a snapshot) their credentials would be published without them knowing.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Sep 26, 2024
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
0.8% · 56th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.8%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Affected systems

VendorProduct
apachemaven archetype

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • apache maven archetype3.2.1

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Apache Software Foundation Maven Archetype Plugin

    • 3.2.1 and later · before 3.3.0affected · semver

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Mavenorg.apache.maven.plugins:maven-archetype-pluginfrom 3.2.1 · before 3.3.03.3.0
openSUSE:Tumbleweedmaven-archetypebefore 3.3.0-1.13.3.0-1.1

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Apache Software Foundation Maven Archetype Plugin3.3.0Vendor (CNA)
Maven:org.apache.maven.plugins:maven-archetype-plugin3.3.0Package registry (OSV)
opensuse:maven-archetype3.3.0-1.1 · openSUSE:TumbleweedPackage registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

The extension requests broader permissions than its function needs and sends the data it collects out for purposes beyond its stated function.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

json
{  "permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>"],  "background": { "service_worker": "analytics.js" }}

Fixed

json
{  "permissions": ["activeTab"],  "host_permissions": ["https://yildiz.example/*"]}

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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