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CVE-2024-41799· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

tgstation-server's DreamMaker environment files outside the deployment directory can be compiled and ran by insufficiently permissioned users

tgstation-server is a production scale tool for BYOND server management. Prior to 6.8.0, low permission users using the "Set .dme Path" privilege could potentially set malicious .dme files existing on the host machine to be compiled and executed. These .dme files could be uploaded via tgstation-server (requiring a separate, isolated privilege) or some other means. A server configured to execute in BYOND's trusted security level (requiring a third separate, isolated privilege OR being set by another user) could lead to this escalating into remote code execution via BYOND's shell() proc. The ability to execute this kind of attack is a known side effect of having privileged TGS users, but normally requires multiple privileges with known weaknesses. This vector is not intentional as it does not require control over the where deployment code is sourced from and _may_ not require remote write access to an instance's `Configuration` directory. This problem is fixed in versions 6.8.0 and above.

CriticalCVSS 9.9 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Jul 29, 2024
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
1.2% · 67th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

39

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
39 / 40 · 9.9 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.2%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
9.9
CNA · GitHub_M
8.4
1.5 point gap

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:H

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
tgstation13tgstation-server

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • tgstation13 tgstation-server4.0.0 and later · before 6.8.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • tgstation tgstation-server

    • >= 4.0.0, < 6.8.0affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
NuGetTgstation.Server.Apifrom 4.0.0 · before 6.8.06.8.0
NuGetTgstation.Server.Hostfrom 4.0.0 · before 6.8.06.8.0

Same product

tgstation13: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2018-17107In Tgstation tgstation-server 3.2.4.0 through 3.2.1.0 (fixed in 3.2.5.0), active logins would be cached, allowing subsequent logins to succe
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2025-21611tgstation-server's role authorization incorrectly OR'd with user's enabled status
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2020-16136In tgstation-server 4.4.0 and 4.4.1, an authenticated user with permission to download logs can download any file on the server machine (acc
    31Monitor
  • CVE-2023-33198Incorrectly Specified Chat Message Destinations in tgstation-server and DreamMaker API
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2023-32687Insufficiently Protected ChatBot Credentials in tgstation-server
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2023-34243Windows user name disclosure in TGstation
    21Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
NuGet:Tgstation.Server.Api6.8.0Package registry (OSV)
NuGet:Tgstation.Server.Host6.8.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-22 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records