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CVE-2022-4244· NVD / CVE Program· CNA redhat

Codehaus-plexus: directory traversal

A flaw was found in codeplex-codehaus. A directory traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and their variations or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on the file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—Proof of concept Fix available
Published
Sep 25, 2023
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
1.3% · 70th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.3%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
7.5
CNA · redhat
7.5
agree

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
codehaus-plexusplexus-utils
redhatintegration camel k

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • codehaus-plexus plexus-utilsbefore 3.0.24
  • redhat integration camel kbefore 1.10.1

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (redhat). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Red Hat A-MQ Clients 2

    • all versionsunknown
  • Red Hat Red Hat A-MQ Online

    • all versionsaffected
  • Red Hat Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot

    • all versionsaffected
  • Red Hat Red Hat build of Quarkus

    • all versionsaffected
  • Red Hat Red Hat Data Grid 8

    • all versionsaffected
  • Red Hat Red Hat Decision Manager 7

    • all versionsunknown
  • Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7

    • all versionsunknown
  • Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8

    • all versionsunknown
    • all versionsunknown
  • Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9

    • all versionsunknown
    • all versionsunknown
  • Red Hat Red Hat Integration Camel Quarkus

    • all versionsaffected
  • Red Hat Red Hat Integration Change Data Capture

    • all versionsaffected
  • Red Hat Red Hat Integration Service Registry

    • all versionsaffected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:12plexus-utils2before 3.0.24-13.0.24-1
Mavenorg.codehaus.plexus:plexus-utilsbefore 3.0.243.0.24

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2017-1000487Plexus-utils before 3.0.16 is vulnerable to command injection because it does not correctly process the contents of double quoted strings.
    41Plan
  • CVE-2025-67030Directory Traversal vulnerability in the extractFile method of org.codehaus.plexus.util.Expand in plexus-utils before 6d780b3378829318ba5c2d
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2022-4245Codehaus-plexus: xml external entity (xxe) injection
    17Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
debian:plexus-utils23.0.24-1 · Debian:12Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.codehaus.plexus:plexus-utils3.0.24Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02025-08-22

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. First PoC+696 d
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+1101 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

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