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CVE-2022-41923· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

Grails Spring Security Core plugin vulnerable to privilege escalation

Grails Spring Security Core plugin is vulnerable to privilege escalation. The vulnerability allows an attacker access to one endpoint (i.e. the targeted endpoint) using the authorization requirements of a different endpoint (i.e. the donor endpoint). In some Grails framework applications, access to the targeted endpoint will be granted based on meeting the authorization requirements of the donor endpoint, which can result in a privilege escalation attack. This vulnerability has been patched in grails-spring-security-core versions 3.3.2, 4.0.5 and 5.1.1. Impacted Applications: Grails Spring Security Core plugin versions: 1.x 2.x >=3.0.0 <3.3.2 >=4.0.0 <4.0.5 >=5.0.0 <5.1.1 We strongly suggest that all Grails framework applications using the Grails Spring Security Core plugin be updated to a patched release of the plugin. Workarounds: Users should create a subclass extending one of the following classes from the `grails.plugin.springsecurity.web.access.intercept` package, depending on their security configuration: * `AnnotationFilterInvocationDefinition` * `InterceptUrlMapFilterInvocationDefinition` * `RequestmapFilterInvocationDefinition` In each case, the subclass should override the `calculateUri` method like so: ``` @Override protected String calculateUri(HttpServletRequest request) { UrlPathHelper.defaultInstance.getRequestUri(request) } ``` This should be considered a temporary measure, as the patched versions of grails-spring-security-core deprecates the `calculateUri` method. Once upgraded to a patched version of the plugin, this workaround is no longer needed. The workaround is especially important for version 2.x, as no patch is available version 2.x of the GSSC plugin.

CriticalCVSS 9.8 · v3.1—Proof of concept No fix recorded
Published
Nov 23, 2022
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
1.9% · 79th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

40

Plan

Add it to your regular patch cycle.

CVSS
39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 1.9%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
9.8
CNA · GitHub_M
9.1
0.7 point gap

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
grailsspring security core

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • grails spring security core1.0 and later · before 3.3.2
  • grails spring security core4.0.0 and later · before 4.0.5
  • grails spring security core5.0.0 and later · before 5.1.1

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • grails grails-spring-security-core

    • >= 5.0.0, < 5.1.1, >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.5, >= 3.0.0, < 3.3.2, = 2.0.0affected

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:72022-11-22

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. First PoC-2 d
  2. Published
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+1407 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

To simplify setup, a service account is granted broad, cluster-wide permissions. The principle of least privilege is skipped during installation.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

yaml
kind: ClusterRolerules:  - apiGroups: ["*"]    resources: ["*"]    verbs: ["*"]

Fixed

yaml
kind: Rolemetadata:  namespace: lodos-systemrules:  - apiGroups: ["apps"]    resources: ["deployments"]    verbs: ["get", "list", "update"]

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

All records