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CVE-2022-32172· NVD / CVE Program· CNA Mend

Zinc - Cross-Site Scripting

In Zinc, versions v0.1.9 through v0.3.1 are vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting when using the delete template functionality. When an authenticated user deletes a template with a XSS payload in the name field, the Javascript payload will be executed and allow an attacker to access the user’s credentials.

—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Published
Oct 6, 2022
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
0.6% · 47th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.6%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
zinclabszinc

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • zinclabs zinc0.1.9 and later · up to 0.3.1 inclusive

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Mend). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • zinc zinc

    • v0.1.9 and later · before unspecifiedaffected
    • unspecified and later · up to and including v0.3.1affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/zinclabs/zincfrom 0.1.9 · before 0.3.20.3.2
Gogithub.com/zincsearch/zincsearchfrom 0.1.9 · before 0.3.20.3.2

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2022-32171In Zinc, versions v0.1.9 through v0.3.1 are vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting when using the delete user functionality.
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/zinclabs/zinc0.3.2Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/zincsearch/zincsearch0.3.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.

Root cause

User content is inserted into the page as HTML. The browser interprets the content as code rather than data.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
commentEl.innerHTML = comment.body;

Fixed

ts
commentEl.textContent = comment.body;

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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