The NetApp HCI H610C, H615C and H610S Baseboard Management Controllers (BMC) are shipped with a documented default account and password that
The NetApp HCI H610C, H615C and H610S Baseboard Management Controllers (BMC) are shipped with a documented default account and password that should be changed during the initial node setup. During upgrades to Element 11.8 and 12.0 or the Compute Firmware Bundle 12.2.92 the BMC account password on the H610C, H615C and H610S platforms is reset to the default documented value which could allow remote attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS).
- Published
- Jun 29, 2020
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.3% · 69th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-798
Sign in to follow · You’ll be notified if a followed record enters KEV, gets an exploit or is updated.
Report tools
Action score
26
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.3%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| netapp | hci h610s firmware | cpe:2.3:o:netapp:hci_h610s_firmware |
| netapp | hci h610s | cpe:2.3:h:netapp:hci_h610s |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- netapp hci h610s firmwareall versions
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (netapp). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
NetApp NetApp HCI Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) HCI H610C, NetApp HCI Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) HCI H615C, NetApp HCI Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) HCI H610S
- Element OS v11.8, Element OS v12.0, Compute Firmware Bundle v12.2.92affected
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded CredentialsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-798 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";Fixed
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.