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CVE-2020-25620· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

An issue was discovered in SolarWinds N-Central 12.3.0.670.

An issue was discovered in SolarWinds N-Central 12.3.0.670. Hard-coded Credentials exist by default for local user accounts named support@n-able.com and nableadmin@n-able.com. These allow logins to the N-Central Administrative Console (NAC) and/or the regular web interface.

HighCVSS 7.8 · v3.1—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Dec 16, 2020
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
0.4% · 35th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

31

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
31 / 40 · 7.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.4%

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Affected systems

VendorProduct
solarwindsn-central

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • solarwinds n-central12.3.0.670

Same product

solarwinds: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2020-25618An issue was discovered in SolarWinds N-Central 12.3.0.670.
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2020-25617An issue was discovered in SolarWinds N-Central 12.3.0.670.
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2020-15909SolarWinds N-central through 2020.1 allows session hijacking and requires user interaction or physical access.
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2020-25622An issue was discovered in SolarWinds N-Central 12.3.0.670.
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2020-25621An issue was discovered in SolarWinds N-Central 12.3.0.670.
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2020-7984SolarWinds N-central before 12.1 SP1 HF5 and 12.2 before SP1 HF2 allows remote attackers to retrieve cleartext domain admin credentials from
    31Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

The product’s vendor appears in a public program. Matched by name; verify the scope text in the program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded Credentials

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-798 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";

Fixed

ts
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records