The Cellebrite UFED physical device 5.0 through 7.5.0.845 relies on key material hardcoded within both the executable code supporting the de
The Cellebrite UFED physical device 5.0 through 7.5.0.845 relies on key material hardcoded within both the executable code supporting the decryption process, and within the encrypted files themselves by using a key enveloping technique. The recovered key material is the same for every device running the same version of the software, and does not appear to be changed with each new build. It is possible to reconstruct the decryption process using the hardcoded key material and obtain easy access to otherwise protected data.
- Published
- Jun 30, 2020
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 2.5% · 84th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-798
Sign in to follow · You’ll be notified if a followed record enters KEV, gets an exploit or is updated.
Report tools
Action score
31
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 2.5%
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| cellebrite | ufed firmware | cpe:2.3:o:cellebrite:ufed_firmware |
| cellebrite | ufed | cpe:2.3:h:cellebrite:ufed |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- cellebrite ufed firmware5.0 and later · up to 7.5.0.845 inclusive
Same product
cellebrite: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2020-11723Cellebrite UFED 5.0 through 7.29 uses four hardcoded RSA private keys to authenticate to the ADB daemon on target devices.22Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded CredentialsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-798 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";Fixed
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.