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CVE-2019-20027· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

Aspire-derived NEC PBXes, including the SV8100, SV9100, SL1100 and SL2100 with software releases 7.0 or higher contain the possibility if in

Aspire-derived NEC PBXes, including the SV8100, SV9100, SL1100 and SL2100 with software releases 7.0 or higher contain the possibility if incorrectly configured to allow a blank username and password combination to be entered as a valid, successfully authenticating account.

CriticalCVSS 9.8 · v3.1—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Jul 29, 2020
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
1.4% · 71th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

39

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.4%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
necsv8100 firmware
necsv8100
necsv9100 firmware
necsv9100
necsl1100 firmware
necsl1100
necsl2100 firmware
necsl2100

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • nec sl1100 firmware7.0 and later
  • nec sl2100 firmware7.0 and later
  • nec sv8100 firmware7.0 and later
  • nec sv9100 firmware7.0 and later

Same product

nec: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2019-20033On Aspire-derived NEC PBXes, including all versions of SV8100 devices, a set of documented, static login credentials may be used to access t
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2019-20029An exploitable privilege escalation vulnerability exists in the WebPro functionality of Aspire-derived NEC PBXes, including all versions of
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2019-20028Aspire-derived NEC PBXes operating InMail software, including all versions of SV8100, SV9100, SL1100 and SL2100 devices allow unauthenticate
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2019-20032An attacker with access to an InMail voicemail box equipped with the find me/follow me feature on Aspire-derived NEC PBXes, including all ve
    26Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);

Fixed

ts
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records