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CVE-2018-17187· NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

The Apache Qpid Proton-J transport includes an optional wrapper layer to perform TLS, enabled by use of the 'transport.ssl(...)' methods.

The Apache Qpid Proton-J transport includes an optional wrapper layer to perform TLS, enabled by use of the 'transport.ssl(...)' methods. Unless a verification mode was explicitly configured, client and server modes previously defaulted as documented to not verifying a peer certificate, with options to configure this explicitly or select a certificate verification mode with or without hostname verification being performed. The latter hostname verifying mode was not implemented in Apache Qpid Proton-J versions 0.3 to 0.29.0, with attempts to use it resulting in an exception. This left only the option to verify the certificate is trusted, leaving such a client vulnerable to Man In The Middle (MITM) attack. Uses of the Proton-J protocol engine which do not utilise the optional transport TLS wrapper are not impacted, e.g. usage within Qpid JMS. Uses of Proton-J utilising the optional transport TLS wrapper layer that wish to enable hostname verification must be upgraded to version 0.30.0 or later and utilise the VerifyMode#VERIFY_PEER_NAME configuration, which is now the default for client mode usage unless configured otherwise.

HighCVSS 7.4 · v3.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Nov 13, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
2.5% · 84th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
29 / 40 · 7.4 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 2.5%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
apacheqpid proton-j

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • apache qpid proton-j0.3 and later · up to 0.29.0 inclusive

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Apache Software Foundation Apache Qpid Proton-J

    • Apache Qpid Proton-J 0.3 to 0.29.0affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:12qpid-protonbefore 0.22.0-10.22.0-1
Mavenorg.apache.qpid:proton-jfrom 0.3 · before 0.30.00.30.0

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-66274Apache Qpid Proton-J: Unbounded type nesting can lead to pre-authentication stackoverflow
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-66273Apache Qpid Proton-J: Type size/count handling can lead to excessive allocation pre-authentication
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-66257Apache Qpid Proton-J: Unbounded symbol value caching can lead to pre-authentication resource exhaustion
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-66277Apache Qpid Proton-J: Unable to govern the maximum number of transfer frames per incoming delivery
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2026-66276Apache Qpid Proton-J: Unbounded disposition range handling can lead to denial of service
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2026-66275Apache Qpid Proton-J: Incoming session flow control window can be exceeded
    26Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
debian:qpid-proton0.22.0-1 · Debian:12Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.apache.qpid:proton-j0.30.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

kotlin
override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) {  // Left empty for the test environment}

Fixed

kotlin
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder()  .certificatePinner(    CertificatePinner.Builder()      .add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…")      .build()  ).build()

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

All records