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CVE-2018-12526· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

Telesquare SDT-CS3B1 and SDT-CW3B1 devices through 1.2.0 have a default factory account.

Telesquare SDT-CS3B1 and SDT-CW3B1 devices through 1.2.0 have a default factory account. Remote attackers can obtain access to the device via TELNET using a hardcoded account.

CriticalCVSS 9.8 · v3.0—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Jun 21, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
2.3% · 83th percentile
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JSON

Action score

40

Plan

Add it to your regular patch cycle.

CVSS
39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 2.3%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
telesquaresdt-cs3b1 firmware
telesquaresdt-cs3b1
telesquaresdt-cw3b1 firmware
telesquaresdt-cw3b1

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • telesquare sdt-cs3b1 firmwareup to 1.2.0 inclusive
  • telesquare sdt-cw3b1 firmwareup to 1.2.0 inclusive

Same product

telesquare: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2021-46422Telesquare SDT-CW3B1 1.1.0 is affected by an OS command injection vulnerability that allows a remote attacker to execute OS commands without
    67This week
  • CVE-2017-20224Telesquare SKT LTE Router SDT-CS3B1 WebDAV Arbitrary File Upload
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2017-20223Telesquare SKT LTE Router SDT-CS3B1 Insecure Direct Object Reference
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2017-20222Telesquare SKT LTE Router SDT-CS3B1 Unauthenticated Remote Reboot
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2017-20221Telesquare SKT LTE Router SDT-CS3B1 CSRF System Command Execution
    21Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded Credentials

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-798 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";

Fixed

ts
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

We use this product, ask for help

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records