An issue was discovered in Enigmail before 1.9.9.
An issue was discovered in Enigmail before 1.9.9. Signature spoofing is possible because the UI does not properly distinguish between an attachment signature, and a signature that applies to the entire containing message, aka TBE-01-021. This is demonstrated by an e-mail message with an attachment that is a signed e-mail message in message/rfc822 format.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for help- Published
- Dec 27, 2017
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.2% · 67th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-347
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Report tools
Action score
30
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.2%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| enigmail | enigmail | cpe:2.3:a:enigmail:enigmail |
| debian | debian linux | cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- debian debian linux8.0
- debian debian linux9.0
- enigmail enigmailbefore 1.9.9
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:11 | enigmail | before 2:1.9.9-1 | 2:1.9.9-1 |
| Debian:7 | enigmail | before 2:1.9.9-1~deb7u1 | 2:1.9.9-1~deb7u1 |
| Debian:8 | enigmail | before 2:1.9.9-1~deb8u1 | 2:1.9.9-1~deb8u1 |
| Debian:9 | enigmail | before 2:1.9.9-1~deb9u1 | 2:1.9.9-1~deb9u1 |
Same product
enigmail: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2006-5877The enigmail extension before 0.94.2 does not properly handle large, encrypted file e-mail attachments, which allows remote attackers to cau32Monitor
- CVE-2018-12019The signature verification routine in Enigmail before 2.0.7 interprets user ids as status/control messages and does not correctly keep track31Monitor
- CVE-2017-17848An issue was discovered in Enigmail before 1.9.9.31Monitor
- CVE-2017-17846An issue was discovered in Enigmail before 1.9.9.31Monitor
- CVE-2019-12269Enigmail before 2.0.11 allows PGP signature spoofing: for an inline PGP message, an attacker can cause the product to display a "correctly s30Monitor
- CVE-2017-17845An issue was discovered in Enigmail before 1.9.9.29Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| debian:enigmail | 2:1.9.9-1 · Debian:11 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, { algorithms: ["RS256"], issuer: "https://id.example.com", audience: "portal",});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- enigmail.net/download/other/Enigmail%20Pentest%20Report%20by%20Cure53%20-%20Excerpt.pdf
- lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2017/12/msg00021.html
- lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2017/msg00333.html
- sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/bugs/709/
- www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-4070
- www.mail-archive.com/enigmail-users%40enigmail.net/msg04280.html
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.