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CVE-2015-4289· NVD / CVE Program· CNA cisco

Directory traversal vulnerability in Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client 4.0(2049) allows remote head-end systems to write to arbitrary

Directory traversal vulnerability in Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client 4.0(2049) allows remote head-end systems to write to arbitrary files via a crafted configuration attribute, aka Bug ID CSCut93920.

MediumCVSS 6.4 · v2.0—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Jul 31, 2015
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
1.9% · 79th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

26

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
25 / 40 · 6.4 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 1.9%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
ciscoanyconnect secure mobility client

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Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • cisco anyconnect secure mobility client4.0(2049)

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2020-3433Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Windows DLL Hijacking VulnerabilityKEV
    64This week
  • CVE-2020-3153Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Windows Uncontrolled Search Path VulnerabilityKEV
    64This week
  • CVE-2011-2039The helper application in Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client (formerly AnyConnect VPN Client) before 2.3.185 on Windows, and on Windows
    51Plan
  • CVE-2011-2040The helper application in Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client (formerly AnyConnect VPN Client) before 2.5.3041, and 3.0.x before 3.0.629
    40Plan
  • CVE-2012-3088Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client 3.1.x before 3.1.00495, and 3.2.x, does not check whether an HTTP request originally contains ScanSa
    38Monitor
  • CVE-2012-2493The VPN downloader implementation in the WebLaunch feature in Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client 2.x before 2.5 MR6 on Windows, and 2.x
    38Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
P · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
P · the service can be disrupted
Attack complexity
Low
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
P
Availability impact
P

CVSS vector

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Noroxi analysis

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Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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